Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–1095. Argued January 14, 2025—Decided March 21, 2025 Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from one bank. After the bank failed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became responsible for collecting the outstanding loans. Dur- ing a call with the FDIC’s loan servicer, Thompson disputed the $269,120.58 balance shown on his invoice (which consisted of the $219,000 Thompson had borrowed plus interest), stating that he had “no idea where the 269 number comes from” and that he “borrowed . . . $110,000.” Thompson made similar statements in a later call with FDIC contractors. Thompson was later charged with violating 18 U. S. C. §1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state- ment” to influence the FDIC’s action on any loan. A jury found Thomp- son guilty, and he moved for acquittal, arguing that his statements were not false because he had in fact borrowed $110,000, even though he later borrowed more. The courts below concluded that they did not need to reach that argument because they read §1014 to also criminal- ize misleading statements, and Thompson’s statements were at least misleading. Held: Section 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state- ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false. Pp. 4–10. (a) The statutory text criminalizes “false statement[s]” but does not use the word “misleading.” False and misleading are two different things. A misleading statement can be true, and a true statement is not false. Given that, it is significant that the statute uses only the word “false,” which means “not true.” Adding “any” before “false state- ment” does not transform the scope of the statute. A statute that ap- plies to “any false statement” does not cover all misleading statements, only the “false” ones. While the Government argues that “false” and 2 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

“misleading” have long been considered synonyms, the overlap be- tween false statements and misleading ones is beside the point. The only relevant question under the text of §1014 is whether the state- ment—even if misleading, deceitful, or some other adjective—is also “false.” Pp. 4–6. (b) Statutory context confirms that §1014 does not cover all mislead- ing statements. Many other statutes, including other criminal stat- utes in Title 18, expressly prohibit both “false” and “misleading” state- ments. Interpreting “false” in §1014 to include “misleading” would make the inclusion of “misleading” in those statutes superfluous. Fur- ther, when §1014 was enacted in 1948, none of the 11 predecessor pro- visions consolidated into §1014 used the word “misleading,” while many other statutes from the same period used the phrase “false or misleading.” Historical context thus confirms that when Congress in- tended to cover all misleading statements, “it knew how to do so.” Cus- tis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485, 492. Pp. 6–7. (c) Precedent supports the Court’s reading of §1014. In United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, the Court held that §1014 does not in- corporate a materiality requirement because the statute does not “so m