1998 Supreme(SC) 618

1998(4) Supreme 506
Supreme Court of India
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
Dr. A.S. Anand, S.P. Bharucha and B.N. Kirpal, JJ.
R.C. Sood -Petitioner
versus
High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan & Ors. -Respondents
Writ Petition (C) No. 443 of 1995
Decided on 13-5-1998

Important Point
Apart from the non-judicious manner in which the Three Judge Commit­tee conducted the disciplinary enquiry against petitioner the sequence of events shows that there was a complete lack of bona fides on the part of the High Court when it decided on 5.1.95 to initiate discipli­nary proceedings against the petitioner. As the High Court acted in a manner which can only be termed as arbitrary and un­warranted so the entire proceedings initiated by the High Court against the petitioner together with the Full Court’s resolutions dated 30.11.94, 5.1.95 and 6.1.95 are liable to be quashed with costs of Rs. 20,000/-.

Headnote:(i) Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952-Ch. III-Rules 14, 15 and 23-Matters on which all Judges be consulted and effect of any irregularity-Com­plaint of corruption received against petitioner (Registrar of High Court)-Chief Justice decided on 31.4.1994 to exoner­ate petitioner - Whether valid under Rules? (Yes)-Whether complaint was required to be brought before Full Court? (No, until the question of removal or dismissed of judicial officer arises)-Full Court revoked the decision of the Chief Justice dated 31.1.94-Whether correct? (No) (Reason for revocation invalid and complaint was not supported by an affidavit).

       Held : A perusal of these rules show that matters where all the Judges are required to be consulted, namely, those which have been brought to the Full Court, are enumerated in Rule 15. With regard to the judicial officers it is clauses (d) to (g) which are relevant. It is only if a judicial officer is to be removed or dismissed that the matter has to be brought before the Full Court. Under clause (l) if the Chief Jus­tice desires then any matter can be listed before the Full Court. Every complaint received against a judicial officer is not required to be brought before the Full Court unless and until the question of removal or dismissal of the judicial officer arises. It was competent for the Chief Justice especially in view of the provision of sub rule (2) of Rule 32, while dealing with the complaint received against the petitioner, to decide that no action thereon was called for. No ille­gality or impropriety was, therefore, committed by the Chief Justice when he decided on 31st January, 1994 that the complaint of Vijay Singh did not call for any disciplinary action against the petitioner. It is only if the Chief Justice was of the view that disciplinary action may be called for that, by virtue of clauses (e), (f) and (g) the matter would have required to be brought before the Full Court. That apart, the Chief Justice could under clause (I) have brought the complaint to the notice of the Full Court, but he closed not to do so. This was because he was apparently satisfied about the hollowness of the complaint on the basis of the preliminary report of the Additional Registrar (Vigilance) which was received by him. (Para 14)

       We express no opinion on the question whether for good and suffi­cient reasons the Full Court can ever over-rule or recall an earlier decision of the Chief Justice. But the fact that the preliminary report was not brought to the notice of the Full Court, which the Chief Justice was not bound to do, could not be a reason for recalling the order dated 31st January, 1994 of the then Chief Justice. (Para 15)

       Another error which was committed was that the Court in its reso­lution of 30th November, 1994 took into consideration the complaint of Vijay Singh even though the same was not supported by an affidavit. The Chief Justice had by his order dated 12th May, 1994, decided that no complaint against a judicial officer should be entertained unless it is supported by an affidavit. Though this was an administrative order it was passed by the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Rule 32(2) of the said Rules. There was no reason as to why this order should have been ignored and the complaint of Vijay Singh entertained even though it was not supported by an affida­vit. The resolution of 30th November, 1994 also states that some of the Judges have received fresh complaints against the petitioner making serious charges of corruption. No particulars are indicated as to which complaints were received by which Judge. It is evident from the wording of these minutes that what those complaints were, were not even known to all the members of the Full Court when they passed the resolution on 30th November, 1994. We have, therefore, no doubt that when a valid decision had been taken by the then Chief Justice on 31st January 1994 exonerating the petitioner there was no valid reason in law for the Full Court to revoke that decision. (Para 16)

       (ii) Complaint about corruption against Registrar of High Court-Initiation of disciplinary proceedings by a Three Judge Com­mittee -Enquiry conducted in a non-judicious manner-Victimisa­tion of petitioner due to quashing of earlier enquiry by Supreme Court-Wheth­er High Court acted with malafide? (It was arbitrary and unwarranted, to say the least)-Petition allowed. (Paras 25 r/w. 27)

       Held : We have no manner of doubt that there was a complete lack of bona fides on the part of the High Court when it decided on 5th January, 1995 to institute disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. On this ground alone the petitioner is entitled to succeed. (Para 25)

       We have no doubt that all these complaints were procured solely with a view to show that apart from the original complaint of Vijay Singh there were other complaints against the petitioner which represented new material justifying a fresh enquiry. These complaints, some of them being made by discredited persons containing vague and general allegations could not, in our view, be regarded as fresh material which required disci­plinary proceedings being initiated. The said complaints did not merit any serious considerations and reference to them by the High Court was uncalled for. In this connection we reiterate the sen­timents expressed by this Court while allowing the petitioner’s writ petition on the earlier occasion when at page 716 of the report it was observed as follows:

       “This case leaves as very sad. Entrustment of the `control’ of the subordinate judiciary to the High Courts by enactment of the relevant provisions in the Constitution of India, particularly Article 235 therein is for the purpose of ensuring their independence and protec­tion from executive interference. At a time when fairness and non-arbitrariness are the essential requirements of every administrative State action, it is more so for any administrative act of the Judges. It is necessary that members of the subordinate judiciary get no occasion to think otherwise. We are afraid, this incident appears to shake this faith. We do hope it is an inadvertent exception.”

       We are sorry to note that the said hope stands belied and notwith­standing the aforesaid observations the High Court acted in the manner which can only be termed as arbitrary and unwarranted, to say the least. (Para 27)

       Concluded finally : For the aforesaid reasons this writ petition is allowed. The entire disciplinary proceedings initiated by the High Court against the petitioner together with the Full Court’s resolutions dated 30th November, 1994; 5th January, 1995 and 6th January, 1995 are quashed. We also direct the respondents-High Court of Rajasthan to pay Rs. 20,000/- as costs to the petitioner. (Para 28)