2002 Supreme(SC) 302

2002(2) Supreme 203
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madhya Pradesh High Court)
R.C. Lahoti and Mrs. Ruma Pal, JJ.
Sheela & Ors. -Appellants
versus
Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 3965 of 1999
Decided on 4-3-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Gaurav Jain and Ms. Abha Jain, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Satish K. Agnihotri, Advocate.

VERY IMPORTANT POINT
The Courts below were not right in holding availability of ground u/s. 12(1)(c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 for eviction of tenant. However, they are right in holding that tenant is liable to be evicted    u/s. 12(1)(h). But before passing decree, the requirements of Section 18 shall have to be fulfilled.

Headnote:(i) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Section 12(1)(c)-Scope of ground under Section 12(1)(c)-Denial of title of landlord whether attracts Section 12(1)(c)? (Yes)-Whether in the present case courts below were right in holding that tenant is liable to be evicted u/s. 12(1)(c)? (No)-Result-Decree on ground of 12(1)(c) set aside.

       Held : In our opinion, denial of landlord s title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. A tenant bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to protect himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available to him by Rent Control Law but without disowning his character of possession over the tenancy premises as tenant cannot be said to have denied the title of landlord or disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act of the tenant does not attract applicability of Section 12(1)(c) abovesaid. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability. We have perused the copy of written statement, made available to us by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, wherein is contained the alleged denial of title. Vide para 2 of the written statement the defendant stated - "the owner of the house was late Khetsidas. On what basis the plaintiff -firm or its partners claim themselves to be the owner of the property is for them to prove". Vide para 3 of the written statement it is again stated - "the plaintiff-firm is not the original owner of the house nor the rent of Rs.17/- per month was settled between the defendant and the plaintiff . However, nowhere in the written statement the defendant has disowned the character and nature of his possession over the suit premises as tenant. He has neither pleaded the title in the suit property in himself nor pleaded that anyone other than the plaintiffs is the owner of the property. On the contrary, in the written statement, as also in his deposition, the defendant has admitted his having paid rent to the plaintiffs and having initiated proceedings before the Rent Controller for fixation of standard rent of the premises impleading the plaintiff-firm as the landlord - opposite party. To put it in other words, what the tenant has said, is something like this - "Yes, I am a tenant in the suit premises; I have paid the rent to you (and I may continue to do so): but before you may be held entitled to a decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, I, in order to protect myself from eviction, call upon you to satisfy the court and let me also be satisfied if you are the owner of the suit premises." The nature of the plea raised and the stand taken by the defendant in the written statement and at the trial is that he is the tenant and the plaintiffs are the landlord , as defined in the Act, but the defendant demands proof of ownership of the plaintiffs over the suit property as it cannot be spelled out from the averments made in the plaint how the title over the property came to vest from Swami Khetsidas, who had inducted the defendant as tenant in the suit premises, to Prahlad Rai though the latter was not a natural born son of Swami Khetsidas and again from Prahlad Rai to the partnership firm which was suing the tenant claiming itself to be the landlord of the premises and arraying itself as plaintiff. The tenant would feel satisfied once the information leading to such vesting of title was disclosed and appealed to the Court. The primary purpose behind raising the plea was a bona fide effort on the part of the tenant to protect himself by insisting on the plaintiff satisfying all the requirements of the relevant provision of law, that is Section 12(1)(f), before he was called upon to vacate. The pleading of the defendant has to be read and appreciated in the light of the requirements of Section 12(1)(f) of the Act which provision requires a decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement being passed only in favour of an owner-landlord ; ownership (as understood in Rent Control Law) being one of the ingredients of the ground for eviction. Such a plea raised by the defendant in his written statement is not a malicious act of the tenant. The plaintiff staking a claim for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) has also to prove ownership, apart from landlordship. It would have been different if the tenant would have raised such a plea as a malicious or wanton act of himself by raising on his own a dispute as to the title of the landlord as owner of the suit premises though the question of ownership was not germane to the claim for eviction or if he would have disowned his character as tenant whilst in possession of the premises. The plea raised by the defendant in his written statement is not a clear and unequivocal denial of the title of the landlord. There is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the tenant while raising such plea. The First Appellate Court and the High Court were, therefore, not right in holding availability of ground under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act for eviction of the tenant basing such finding on the tenant s plea raised in the written statement. (Paras 17 & 18)

       (ii) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Section 12(1)(h)-Eviction on ground of building or re-building-Courts below found suit building dilapidated-Reconstruction plan and funds proved-Eviction ordered-Whether correct? (Yes)-But safeguard of Section 18 to be followed before passing decree-Appeal disposed of accordingly.

       Held : So far as the availability of ground under Section 12(1)(h) of the Act is concerned no fault can be found with the finding arrived at by the Trial Court that the accommodation was required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of re-building, the same which activity could not be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. The appeal is therefore allowed in part. Decree for eviction of tenant under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act is set aside. Instead the tenant is held liable to be evicted under Section 12(1)(h) of the Act. Before passing the decree, the requirement of Section 18 shall have to be fulfilled. The parties shall appear before the Trial Court which shall ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the accommodation from which he is to be evicted consistently with Section 18 of the Act and to make consequential orders as contemplated therein. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No order as to the costs. (Paras19& 20)