2002(7) Supreme 85
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
[From Additional Sessions Court, Ferozepur (Punjab)]
Umesh C. Banerjee & Y.K. Sabharwal, JJ.
Sarwan Singh -Appellant
versus
State of Punjab -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 480 of 2001
Decided on 7-10-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Mohit Mathur, Abhay Kumar, S.N. Jha, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mrs. Monika Gusain, Advocate for Rajeev Sharma, Advocate.
(ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 302/307/34 and Section 3 of TADA-Conviction of appellants under by Designated Court-Appeal u/s 19 of TADA-PS and MS were taken to the field of SS by appellants, who murdered PS and caused fire arms injuries to M.S.-Contention that they are involved falsely due to previous enemity-Whether correct? (No) (see paras 8 and 9)-Contention that appellants were already in police custody at the time of offence-Not correct as occurrence was at 3 A.M. of 12.10.90 and on 13.10.90 they were arrested in connection with firing on police officials (see para 10)-Whether appellants are entitled to benefit on grounds that weapons were not sent to ballistic expert or that only interested witnesses were examined or that no expert opinion connecting the gun to recovered empty cartridges was obtained or that accused was not identified property? (No) (see paras 12 to 18)-Result-Appeal dismissed.
Held : The preponderance of evidence available on record, in our view, does justify the view taken by the Designated Court and the same cannot and ought not to be interfered with. In that view of the matter, this appeal fails and is dismissed. (Paras 19 and 20)
JUDGMENT
Banerjee, J.-On the backdrop of escalation of terrorist activities in the country, Parliamentary wisdom prompted it to introduce in the Statute Book the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 and since there was an expectation that the activities concerned would be curbed within a period of two years, life of the said Act of 1985 was restricted to a period of two years from the date of its commencement. But unfortunately, the terrorist violence continued unabated and resultantly the Government thought it prudent to extend the life of the legislation from time to time. In one of the earliest pronouncements of this Court after the introduction of the said Act, this Court in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon & Ors. v. State of Gujarat [1988(2) SCC 271] in no uncertain terms stated that the intendment of the legislation is to provide special machinery to combat the growing menace of terrorism in different parts of the country. This court also did emphasise that since the legislation is a drastic one, the same should not ordinarily be resorted to unless the government s law enforcing machinery fails. In paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Report this Court observed :
"17. The legislature by enacting the law has treated terrorism as a special criminal problem and created a special court called a Designated Court to deal with the special problem and provided for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. A grievance was made before us that the State Government by notification issued under Section 9(1) of the Act has appointed District and Sessions Judges as well as Additional District and Sessions Judges to be judges of such Designated Courts in the State. The use of ordinary courts does not necessarily imply the use of standard procedures. Just as the legislature can create a special court to deal with a special problem, it can also create new procedures within the existing system. Parliament in its wisdom has adopted the framework of the Code but the Code is not applicable. The Act is a special Act and creates a new class of offences called terrorist acts and disruptive activities as defined in Sections 3(1) and 4(2) and provides for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. Under Section 9(1), the Central Government or a State Government may by notification published in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Designated Courts for the trial of offences under the Act for such area or areas, or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification. The jurisdiction and power of a Designated Court is derived from the Act and it is the Act that one must primarily look to in deciding the question before us. Under Section 14(1), a Designated Court has exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of offences under the Act and by virtue of Section 12(1) it may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence. Where an enactment provides for a special procedure for the trial of certain offences, it is that procedure that must be followed and not the one prescribed by the Code.
18. No doubt, the legislature by the use of the words as if it were in Section 14(3) of the Act vested a Designated Court with the status of a Court of Session. But, as contended for by learned counsel for the State Government, the legal fiction contained therein must be restricted to the procedure to be followed for the trial of an offence under the Act i.e. such trial must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of the trial before a Court of Session, insofar as applicable. We must give some meaning to the opening words of Section 14(3) Subject to the other provisions of the Act and adopt a construction in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act. The manifest intention of the legislature is to take away the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under the Code with respect
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