RAGHUBAR DAYAL, K.SUBBA RAO, J.R.MUDHOLKAR
Manindra Land And Building Corporation, LTD. – Appellant
Versus
Bhutnath Banerjee – Respondent
Key Points: - The judgment discusses the High Court’s revisional powers under S. 115 CPC in cases involving questions of jurisdiction and whether a subordinate court has exercised jurisdiction properly; it clarifies that revisional interference is allowed for jurisdictional errors, not merely erroneous findings of law or fact (!) (!) (!) . - It holds that a Court can admit an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act if sufficient cause is shown for not presenting within time, affecting the period for setting aside abatement under Order XXII Rule 9(2) (!) (!) . - It distinguishes cases where the question concerns jurisdiction as a law question from cases where the question is within the court’s jurisdiction to decide; misapplication of limitation law can render a decision reviewable in revision if it affects jurisdiction (!) (!) . - It confirms that the trial court’s findings on sufficient cause are factual and should not be reversed in revision unless they involve jurisdictional error; High Court’s interference is limited to questions of jurisdiction or illegal exercise of jurisdiction (!) (!) . - The appeal was allowed, the trial court’s order restored, enabling further execution proceedings (!) (!) . - It cites Manindra, Abbasbhai Alimahomed, Pandurang, D.L.F. Housing, and Misrilal Parasmal as authorities on when revisional jurisdiction can be invoked (jurisdictional issues or illegal exercise) (!) (!) . - It clarifies the distinction between deciding a question of law pertaining to jurisdiction versus merely erroneous application of limitation periods (!) (!) . - It emphasizes that Section 3 of the Limitation Act requires dismissal of suits or applications beyond prescribed periods, while Section 5 allows admission of delayed applications for sufficient cause (!) (!) . - It references the appellate outcome: appeal allowed and order set aside; case to proceed according to law (!) .
Judgement
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. : This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the order of the Calcutta High Court allowing the application of the appellant under sub-r. (2) of R. 9 of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter called the Code, for the setting aside of the abatement of the suit it had instituted against the father of the respondents.
2. The suit was instituted on April 29, 1952, by the appellant corporation against Kalosashi Banerji, father of the respondents, to recover a sum of money due on a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds. The defendant contested the suit. Ultimately, a preliminary decree in the suit was passed ex parte on February 8, 1955. On an application presented on June 11, 1955, final decree was passed on June 23, 1955.
3. The first application for execution of the decree presented on August 30, 1955, was dismissed for default on October 4, 1955, on account of the decree-holder not taking any steps as a result of the report of the process server dated September 14, 1955, stating that the defendant Kalosashi Banerji had died.
4. The second application for execution of the decree against the defendant s legal representatives was presented on
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