Girijanandini Devi vs Bijendra Narain Choudhary

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1966 Supreme(SC) 164

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND R.S. BACHAWAT, JJ.
Girijanandini Devi and others, Appellants
Versus
Bijendra Narain Choudhary, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 756 of 1964,
D/-11-8-1966.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, Senior Advocate (M/s. D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthi, Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi and Co., with him), for Appellants; Mr. D. Goburdhun, Advocate, for Respondent.

Advocates:
D.GOVERDHAN CHARY, D.P.Singh, M.K.RAMAMURTHY, R.K.GARG, S.C.AGRAWAL, SARJU PRASAD

Headnote:SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY AND OBJECT - CLAIM THAT PROPERTY BELONGED TO JOINT FAMILY - AMENDMENT WHEN NOT NECESSARY - APPELLATE COURT AGREEING WITH VIEW OF TRIAL COURT - CLAIM FOR RENDITION OF ACCOUNT
       -the provisions of this Section seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the Court to give effect to real as against benami title. The object of the clause is to prevent claims before the Civil Court that the certified purchaser purchased the property benami for another person. Thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to give effect to the real as against the nominal title is restricted and the Section must be strictly construed. Where a person alleges that a property purchased at a Court auction was purchased on his behalf or on behalf of some one through whom he claims, the suit is clearly barred - Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury, AIR 1967 SC 1124. This Section is not applicable to sales by Receiver - Tarinikamal Pandit v. Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee, AIR 1979 SC 1165 = (1979) 3 SCR 340.
       -because they were purchased with the aid of joint family funds in the name of third person, such a claim does not fall within the terms of sub-section (1) of this Section
       -where the plaintiff set up a case that a document relied upon by the defendants in support of their case is a fabrication, it is not necessary for him either by his original plaint or by amendment therein to formally plead that the document is a fabrication and he is entitled to ask the Court to try that plea
       where the Appellate Court agreed with the view of the Trial Court on the evidence, it is not necessary for the Appellate Court either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the Trial Court. Expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Trial Court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice -
       -a claim for rendition of account is not personal claim. It is not extinguished between the party who claims on account, the party who is called upon to account dies. The maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” a personal action dies with the person, has a limited application. It operates in a limited class of actions ex delicto such as actions for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing death of the party and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. An action for account is not an action for damages ex delicto, and does not fall within the enumerated classes. Nor is it such that the relief claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory. Death of the person liable to render an account for property received by him does not therefore affect the liability of his estate—

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:

The section under consideration aims to restrict the jurisdiction of civil courts from entertaining claims that challenge the true ownership of property purchased at court auction if the property was bought benami for another person. The purpose is to prevent disputes based on nominal versus real titles, and the section must be strictly interpreted. Claims alleging that a property was purchased on behalf of another person are barred if they fall within the scope of this section (!) .
The section does not apply to sales conducted by a court-appointed receiver, as these are considered separate transactions (!) .
If a property was acquired using joint family funds in the name of a third person, such a claim does not fall under the restrictions of this section (!) .
When a plaintiff disputes the authenticity of a document relied upon by the defendant, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to explicitly plead that the document is a fabrication in the original or amended plaint. The court can consider the issue based on evidence, and it is not required to formally plead fabrication to challenge the document (!) .
When appellate courts agree with the findings of the trial court based on the evidence, it suffices for them to express general agreement without restating all evidence or reasons. This approach is considered sufficient and consistent with judicial practice (!) .
An action for rendition of account is not a personal claim and is not extinguished upon the death of the liable party. The liability extends to the estate, and death does not bar such claims. The court can direct an account against the estate of the deceased party (!) .
The specification of shares in a decree does not necessarily mean there has been a severance of joint family status unless accompanied by conduct or explicit intention to sever. The mere determination of shares does not automatically imply a breakup of the joint family (!) .
The presumption in joint family law is that the family remains joint until proven otherwise, and mere ascertaining of shares does not establish separation. Evidence of conduct and intention is required to establish severance (!) .
The management of properties by a receiver and subsequent payments to a member do not conclusively prove severance of joint family status, especially if such payments occur after the institution of a suit or decree (!) .
The conduct of the parties, including how properties are purchased and managed, along with specific circumstances like court decrees and management, are critical in determining whether a joint family has been severed or continues to exist (!) .
Claims regarding properties purchased at court auction in the name of a family member, where it is alleged that the property was acquired with joint family funds, are permissible unless the claim explicitly states that the property was purchased on behalf of another person. Such claims are not barred by the relevant procedural provisions if the claim is based on joint family ownership (!) .
The death of a party during proceedings does not necessarily preclude a claim for accounts related to joint family property, as such claims are not personal actions but relate to estate management. Therefore, liability can be extended to the estate, and proceedings can continue against the deceased’s successors (!) .

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Judgement

SHAH, J. : This appeal with certificate under Art. 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution arises out of suit No. 17 of 1942 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Purnea filed by Bijendra Narain son of Ishwari Narain against Mode Narain, Hari Narain and Rajballav Narain sons of Bidya Narain & others for a decree for partition & separate possession of a half share in the properties described in Schedules A, B, and C to the plaint. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court and in appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna the decree was confirmed with a s1ight modification. The defendants in the suit have appealed to this Court.

2. One Mankishun had four sons: Talebar, Indra Narain, Chandra Narain and Shyam Narain. Talebar had two sons Hanuman and Raghu Nandan. Hanuman died leaving him surviving no lineal descendant and Raghu Nandan adopted Udit Narain - grandson of his uncle Shyam Narain. In 1923 Udit Narain and the sons of Shyam Narain instituted suit No. 27 of 1923 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Purnea, impleading as defendants the descendants of Indra Narain and Chandra Narain as parties thereto, for partition and separate possession of a half share in the properties of the joint family. Bijendra Narain son of Ishwari Narain who was at the date of the suit a minor was impleaded as the 8th defendant, by his guardian-adlitem. Bidya Narain his uncle, was impleaded as the 4th defendant. Mode Narain, Hari Narain and Rajballav Narain sons of Bidya Narain, were impleaded as defendants 5, 6 and 7. A preliminary decree was passed in the suit on July, 1924 by consent of parties. By Para. (a) of the decree the adoption of Udit Narain as a son by Raghu Nandan was admitted and it was agreed that Udit Narain was entitled in the properly in suit to a fourth share as adopted son of Raghu Nandan, and a twelfth share as heir of his natural father Shyam Narain. The decree further provided :-

"(b) That the parties agree that the family estate is still joint and that the entire family estate except those that have already been partitioned as detailed below in Scheduled will be partitioned by metes and bounds (according) to the shares as defined above * * *

Plaintiff No. 1-Four annas share.

Plaintiffs Nos. 1-3 one anna four pies share.

Plaintiffs Nos. 4 and 5 One anna four pies share.

Plaintiffs Nos. 6, 7 and 8 One anna four pies share.

Defendants I and 2 Two annas share.

Defendant No. 3 Two annas share.

Defendants Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 8 Two annas share.

Defendant No. 8 Two annas share.

(1) That the parties agree that at the time of partition by the arbitrators one allotment should be made for defendants Nos. 1 to 3 s four annas share, and one allotment should be made for defendants 4 to 8 s four annas share,. i.e., three allotments will be made as aforesaid."

Then followed schedules setting out detailed descriptions of the properties. A decree final was made on February 15, 1937 and the properties of the family were divided in three lots: the first lot representing an eight anna share of Udit Narain and the sons of Shyam Narain, the second representing a four anna share of the branch of Indra Narain, and the third a four anna share of defendants 4 to 8 of the branch of Chandra Narain.

3. Bijendra Narain attained the age of majority in 1934, and on July 10, 1942 commenced the present action for partition of a half share in the properties which were in the possession of Bidya Narain, his sons and grandsons alleging that he (Bijendra Narain) came to learn in 1938 that talking advantage of his minority and inexperience his uncle Bidya Narain and the sons of Bidya Narain had purchased in their own names many properties with the aid of joint family funds and had acquired certain other properties in the name of Bashisht Narain - (twenty-fourth defendant in the suit) who was daughter s son of Bidya Narain - that in September, 1941 certain respectable r

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