JUDGMENT

BEG, J.:— This appeal by special leave granted to the Regional Manager of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Allahabad, challenges the findings of a learned single Judge, affirmed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, holding that the respondent, Pawan Kumar Dubey, was reverted from the post of a Senior Station Incharge, in which he was officiating, to his substantive post of a Junior Station Incharge by means of an order dated 20-2-1973 passed as a measure of punishment inflicted upon him for alleged misconduct indicated by an adverse entry communicated to him by a letter dated 25th January, 1973. His juniors, it was found, were still officiating in posts of Senior Station Incharge. The respondents chances of promotion were said to be adversely affected by the reason given for the reversion in the impugned orders that the respondent was "not fit yet" for the higher post.

2. The learned single Judge and the Division bench in the Allahabad High Court were referred to several decisions of this Court mentioned by the Division Bench. These were: State of Bombay v. F. A. Abraham, (1962) Supp (2) SCR 92; Champaklal v. Union of India, 1964 (5) SCR 190; Divisional Personnel Officer v. Raghavendrachar, (1966) 3 SCR 106; and State of U. P. v. Sughar Singh, (1974) 2 SCR 335.

3. The Allahabad High Court had followed what it considered to be the ratio decidendi of Sughar Singhs case (supra), the last case of this Court available at the time. Special leave to appeal was sought in the case before us on the ground that Sughar Singhs case (AIR 1974 SC 423) (supra) had been misunderstood by the High Court and required some elucidation by this Court. Special Leave was granted on condition that in any event, the costs of the respondent will be borne by the appellants.The question to be determined was assumed to be one of law only. The appeal was, therefore, to be heard on the special leave paper book with such additional documents from the record of the case as the parties may choose to file.

4. We find that, although a number of documents were filed, neither side has chosen to file a copy of the order impugred which has been interpreted by the single Judge as well as by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court as one amounting to award of a punishment not merely in the light of the circumstances preceding the order but also and its effect upon the respondents future. The question, there fore, arises whether we really have before us any point of law of such a nature as to justify interference in exercise of the exceptional powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

5. Even though we have come to the conclusion that the question before us is substantially one of fact, we would like to explain a little the law applicable to such cases in view of the submission that Sughar Singhs case (AIR 1974 SC 423) (supra) had led to some misunderstanding of it. Not much clarification seems necessary so far as conditions for the application of Article 311 (2) are concerned as this question has been considered and decided by this Court in a number of cases including the recent decision by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 1 SCR 814. It was pointed out in that case (at page 837 of SCR).

"No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment on the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or, inefficiency, or, for similar reason, without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge, it may, in a given case, amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution."

6. Shamsher Singhs case (AIR 1974 SC 2192) (supre) related to an order of termination of service