Judgment

BHAGWATI, J. (for himself and on behalf of A. C. Gupta J.):- We have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by our learned brother S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and we agree with the conclusion reached by him in that judgment but we would prefer to give our own reasons. The facts giving rise to the appeal are set out clearly and succinctly in the judgment of our learned brother and we do not think it necessary to reiterate them.

2. The short question that arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether it is sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956 that applies where property is given to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an instrument which in so many terms restricts the nature of the interest given to her in the property. If sub-section (1) applies, then the limitations on the nature of her interest are wiped out and she becomes the full owner of the property while on the other hand, if sub-section (2) governs such a case her limited interest in the property is not enlarged and she continues to have the restricted estate prescribed by the instrument. The question is of some complexity and it has evoked wide diversity of judicial opinion not only amongst the different High Courts but also within some of the High Courts themselves. It is indeed unfortunate that though it became evident as far back as 1967 that subsections (1) and (2) of Section 14 were presenting serious difficulties of construction in cases where property was received by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance and the instrument granting such property prescribed a restricted estate for her in the property and divergence of judicial opinion was creating a situation which 1946 might well be described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always possess in order to guide the affairs of men, the legislature, for all these years did not care to step in to remove the constructional dilemma facing the courts and adopted an attitude of indifference and inaction, untroubled and unmoved by the large number of cases on this point encumbering the files of different courts in the country, when by the simple expedient of an amendment, it could have silenced judicial conflict and put an end to needless litigation. This is a classic instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants and proved a paradise for lawyers. It illustrates forcibly the need of an authority or body to be set up by the Government or the Legislature which would constantly keep in touch with the adjudicatory authorities in the country as also with the legal profession and immediately respond by making recommendations for suitable amendments whenever it is found that a particular statutory provision is, by reason of inapt language or unhappy draftsmanship. Creating difficulty of construction or is otherwise inadequate or defective or is not well conceived and is consequently counter-productive of the result it was intended to achieve. If there is a close inter-action between the adjudicatory wing of the State and a dvnamic and ever-alert authority or body which responds swiftly to the drawbacks and deficiencies in the law in action. much of the time and money, which is at present expended in fruitless litigation would be saved and law would achieve a certain amount of clarity, certainty and simplicity which alone can make it easily intelligible to the people.

3. Since the determination of the question in appeal turns on the true interpretation to be placed on sub-section (2) read in the context of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956, it would be convenient at this stage to set out both the sub-sections of that section which read as follows:

"14 (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a l