Advocates:
HARDEV SINGH, M.L.Sethi, S.K.MEHTA, S.Ranga Raju

The ratio decidendi of the judgment (majority view by Jaswant Singh, J., for himself and A.N. Ray, C.J.I.) is as follows:

1. Presumption of death under Section 108 of the Evidence Act: This section permits a presumption that a person is dead if not heard of for seven years by those likely to hear of them if alive. However, it raises no presumption as to the precise time of death within that period. Where the date of death is essential (e.g., to show a suit is within the three-year limitation period for reversioners' possession suits under Article 2(b) of the Schedule to the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act, 1920, post-declaratory decree), the plaintiff bears the onus to prove it by evidence, beyond mere lapse of seven years. Failure to do so renders the suit time-barred, as the right to sue accrues on the date of death, not the presumption's arising. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)

2. Applicability of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act: Time spent prosecuting prior civil proceedings (in a court of first instance or appeal) against the same defendant is excludable only if: (i) prosecuted with due diligence and good faith; (ii) based on the same cause of action; and (iii) the court was unable to entertain it due to a "defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature." The phrase "or other cause of a like nature" is to be construed ejusdem generis with "defect of jurisdiction," limited to analogous defects rendering the court inherently incapable of entertaining the suit (e.g., lack of territorial/pecuniary jurisdiction). Dismissal of prior suits as premature (for failure to prove death/cause of action accrual) does not qualify, as the court had jurisdiction but found facts wanting. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)

3. Distinction in causes of action: Prior suits alleging death on a specific date (15 August 1945) failed for lack of proof, establishing one cause of action. Subsequent suits relying on Section 108 presumption (non-hearing for seven years post-1945) assert a distinct cause of action, preventing Section 14 exclusion and requiring independent proof of limitation compliance. (!) (!) (!) (!)

Result: The plaintiffs' suits for possession (claiming reversionary rights post-extinction of alienee's line) were barred by the three-year limitation under the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act, 1920; no exclusion under Section 14; appeals dismissed. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)

(Note: The minority view by M.H. Beg, J., differed, holding causes of action distinct with the new one accruing within limitation upon presumption maturity, obviating Section 14; but the majority holding prevails.) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)