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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.K. GOSWAMI AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.
Smt. Nai Bahu, Appellant
Versus
Lala Ramnarayan and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1971
Decided on 14-10-1977
Advocates appeared
Mr. G. B. Pai, Sr. Advocate (M/s. S. C. Jain, S. S. Khanduja and Baij Nath Pandey, Advocates with him), for Appellant; Mr. G. L. Sanghi, Sr. Advocate (Mr. A. G. Ratnaparkhi Advocate), for Respondents.
It is well settled that where the Rent Control and Restrictions Acts are in operation, a landlord cannot obtain eviction of the tenant unless he can satisfy the requirements of the provisions in those Acts. The general law of landlord and tenant to that extent will give way to the special Act in that behalf. [Para 9]
(2) Civil P.C., 1908 - O. 23, R. 3 - compromise in eviction cases under Rent Control Act - before recording compromise the Court should see whether a ground for eviction is disclosed.
It is well settled that if the Court does not find the permissible grounds for eviction disclosed; in the pleadings and other materials on the record, no consent or compromise will give jurisdiction to the Court to pass a valid decree for eviction. [Para 9]
(3) Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (MP) - S. 4 - compromise decree cannot be passed solely on the ground of compromise - matters to be seen - Civil P.C., 1908 - O. 23, R. 3.
It is true that a decree for eviction of a tenant cannot be passed solely on the basis of a compromise. The Court is to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction has been pleaded which the tenant has admitted by the compromise. Thus dispensing with further proof on account of the compromise, the Court is to be satisfied about compliance with the statutory requirement on the totality of facts of a particular case bearing in mind the entire circumstances from the stage of pleadings upto the stage when the compromise is effected. (1973) 3 SCR 691 relied on. [Para 14]
(4) Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (MP) - S. 4 - compromise decree-powers of executing Court to declare it un-executable - matters to be seen - Civil P.C. 1908 - S. 47.
When a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution the executing Court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. If the pleadings and other materials on the record make out a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing Court will have to give effect to it.
[Para 15]
(5) Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (MP) - Ss. 3(a), 4(g) and (h) – provisions camparred with the provision of the Delhi Act-non-residential accommodation-ground for eviction.
It is clear that under the Delhi Act the scheme is significantly different from that of the M.P. Act (of 1955). The difinition of "premises" in the Delhi Act is a pointer. Under the M.P. Act a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential accommodation if he genuinely requires the same for his business purpose. But the position is not the same under the provisions of the Delhi Act where the landlord cannot ask for eviction of a tenant from the premises let for commercial use even if the former requires it bona fide for his own business purpose. The landlord may seek eviction of the tenant on other grounds but not on the ground of bona fide requirement for his own business under the Delhi Act. (1962) 2 SCR 678 referred to. [Para 19]
There is nothing in the M.P. Act of 1955 to bar an eviction from a building if a non-residental accommodation is genuinely required not only for non-residential use but also a portion of it bona fide for personal residence. We are clearly of opinion that the compromise decree in this case is a lawful decree of eviction founded on permissible statutory ground and there are sufficient materials to show that the trial Court applied its mind and was satisfied that a valid decree under the M.P. Act could be passed. [Para 21]
(6) Deed-Lease-how created.
In a compromise decree in an eviction suit, whether a lease is created or not, it is the dominant intention of the document which must guide its intention. [Para 20]
(7) Registration Act, 1908 - S. 17(1)(d) - compromise decree in eviction suit-compromise giving five years time to be the tenant to vacate the premises-no intention to create lease - registration not necessary. (1977) 3 SCC 347 relied on. [Para 20]
JUDGMENT
GOSWAMI, J. :— This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court of August 19, 1970. The facts and circumstances in this appeal disclose the highly tortuous nature of litigation between the landlord and the tenants. To highlight this aspect we may briefly state the facts.
2. A suit was filed by the appellant on February 17, 1959, for eviction of the respondents (tenants) from a three-storeyed premises. The tenants resisted the claim and trial proceeded in which, after the close of the plaintiffs case, the tenants examined two witnesses and the suit was adjourned for their further evidence to July 12, 1960. On that day a joint compromise petition was filed settling the matter. Statement of counsel on both sides was recorded by the court on the same day and an order was passed on the following day, namely, July 13, 1960 and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise. Without referring to the details of the terms of compromise at this stage, it may be stated that the decree of eviction was executable only after five years.
3. Five years passed. The appellant took execution on July 21, 1965. The execution was resisted by the tenants. They set up a plea of adjustment under Order 21, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. The said objection was rejected by the court on December 10, 1966. An appeal against the said order was also rejected on July 13, 1967. A second appeal by the tenants was dismissed by the High Court on Sept. 27, 1968. Thus the first litigation regarding plea of adjustment of the decree terminated in the High Court on Sept. 27, 1968.
4. Even so, the tenants had already opened another front of attack against 24 the decree on July 17, 1967, by means of an application in the executing court while the earlier litigation in respect of adjustment of the decree was pending. By that application the tenants challenged the decree as a nullity and further objected that the decree incorporated a lease which, on account of non-registration, was invalid and therefore was no executable. The application was rejected by the executing court on July 20, 1967. The judgment-debtor then approached the appeal court which also did not oblige and dismissed his appeal.
5. Undaunted, the judgment debtor filed a second appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and this time successfully. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order. According to the High Court the main question for consideration in the appeal before it was "whether the terms of the decree, which was passed on the basis of a compromise between the parties, created a fresh tenancy and so inhibited the decree-holder from terminating it and taking possession of the demised premises otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act." Answering the question in favour of the appellants (respondents herein) the High Court held that "the terms of compromise created a new demise on different terms in regard to the premises which were not identical with the premises covered by the original lease". The High Court also held that the decree was passed in contravention of the provisions of the Act. The High Court also observed that "the compromise decree purported to create, as shown, a lease for five years" and was "ineffective" on account of non-registration.
6. The High Court refused to grant leave for Letters Patent Appeal and hence this appeal by special leave.
7. Mr. G.B. Pai, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the High Court was entirely wrong in holding that the decree was a nullity. He submits that the case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court reported in Konchada Ramamurthy Subudhi v. Gopinath Naik (1968) 2 SCR 559. In the said appeal the only point raised was whether the compromise decree created a lease or a licence. On the terms of the compromise this Court held that it did not create a lease as "the intention of the parties was not to ente
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