(1) THIS appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Single Judge of the High court of Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 2521 of 1978, dated 20/12/1978 wherein the learned Single Judge set aside the order of the Joint Judge, Poona dated 29/8/1973 made in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 92 of 1973. The facts necessary for disposal of this appeal lie in a short compass

(2) THE Poona Municipality has undertaken widening of the road to remove traffic congestion and initiated proceedings under Section 4(1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquiring the two storied building belonging to N.H. Naik at Kotwal Chowk. The notification under Section 4(1 was published in the Gazette in December 1966. The Land Acquisition Officer passed his award on 14/12/1970. Thereafter, the compensation was deposited and paid to the owner. Pursuant thereto possession was taken on 13/3/1971 by the competent officer and handed over to the Corporation. However, the earlier 24 appellants/tenants who entered into leave and licence agreements with the Corporation were allowed to get into possession. After the expiry of the period of leave and licence, proceedings were initiated for eviction of the appellants and an order in that behalf came to be passed. Calling in question that order of eviction, they went in appeal and writ petition but were unsuccessful. Ultimately, this court affirmed the order of eviction of the appellants. Subsequently, they filed Civil Suit No. 590 of 1973 in the court of the Joint Civil Judge, Poona and sought perpetual injunction from dispossession and for ad interim injunction. The Civil Judge by his order dated 27/4/1973 refused to grant ad interim injunction. The Joint Judge, as stated earlier, on appeal under Section 43(r) Civil Procedure Code allowed the appeal and granted ad interim injunction pending disposal of the suit. The High court in the Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution, by its impugned order dated 20/12/1978 set aside the appellate order and confirmed that of the Civil Judge. Thus this appeal, by special leave

(3) SHRI Rajinder Sachar, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code, High court has power of revision where the appeal is not provided for either to it or subordinate court. Since the Joint Judge had exercised the appellate power, by operation of Section 115(2, the High court was devoid of jurisdiction to exercise the revisional power. When statutory prohibition was imposed by Civil Procedure Code which is a more expeditious and efficacious remedy, the exercise of jurisdiction by the High court under Article 226 was not warranted. At this juncture it is necessary to point out that the High court exercised its power under Article 227 and not either under Article 226 or under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. Even otherwise the bar under Section 115(2 is to exercise revisional power where the party is provided with right of appeal to the High court or the subordinate court against the impugned order. It is not a bar to exercise revisional power under Section 115(1 against appellate order. The ratio in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai is that no second revision under Section 115(1 would lie against revisional order of the subordinate court

(4) HE further contended that the exercise of power under Article 226 is only discretionary; the appellate Judge has gone into the questions of fact and law; the exercise of power under Article 226 is not an appellate power but only one of correcting errors of jurisdiction. The appellate Judge exhaustively dealt with all the points raised by the appellants, it is one of taking an alternative view by the High court to the one taken by the appellate Judge. The High court in that situation was not justified in interfering with the order of the appellate Judge, in particular, when scope of the revisional power under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code itself is very