DINESH MAHESHWARI, ANIRUDDHA BOSE
Asha Rani Gupta – Appellant
Versus
Vineet Kumar – Respondent
Certainly. Here are the key points derived from the provided legal document:
The power of a court to strike off a tenant’s defense in eviction suits is discretionary and must be exercised with caution. Such discretion is especially reserved for bona fide tenants and not applied automatically in every default scenario (!) (!) .
Default in payment or deposit of rent, especially when the defendant denies the landlord-tenant relationship, does not automatically justify striking off the defense. The court must consider whether the default was wilful, deliberate, or volitional, and whether there is a good and adequate reason for the non-compliance (!) (!) .
The requirement for a tenant to deposit the due rent and regularly pay monthly rent during the pendency of the suit is fundamental. Denial of the landlord-tenant relationship does not exempt the tenant from this obligation, and default can lead to the defense being struck off (!) (!) .
The discretion to strike off a defense is not mandatory and should be exercised with circumspection, considering the facts and circumstances of each case. The courts have recognized that such power is meant to prevent frivolous or dilatory defenses but should not be used in a manner that deprives a bona fide tenant of their right to defend (!) (!) .
Denying the relationship of landlord and tenant or disputing ownership alone does not absolve the tenant from their obligation to deposit rent if they are in fact the lessee. Such denial, especially when unsubstantiated, does not justify non-compliance with deposit requirements (!) (!) .
The courts have emphasized that the provisions allowing for striking off defenses are directory rather than mandatory, and the exercise of this discretion must be based on the presence of wilful default or defiance, not mere technicalities or disputes over ownership or title (!) (!) .
When a tenant defaults in payment, even if they dispute the landlord-tenant relationship, they are expected to deposit the rent if they wish to retain a defense. The courts have consistently held that default without lawful or bonafide reasons can lead to the defense being struck off (!) (!) .
The courts have clarified that belated deposits made under an order of the court do not negate the initial default and do not automatically restore the defense. The primary focus remains on whether the default was wilful or volitional (!) .
The courts have recognized that the exercise of discretion in such matters involves balancing the principles of justice and fairness, especially in cases where the defendant has acted in bad faith or with defiance (!) (!) .
Overall, the legal framework and judicial approach endorse a cautious and fact-sensitive exercise of discretion, prioritizing bona fide tenants and discouraging automatic penalties for defaults without considering the context and reasons behind such defaults (!) (!) .
Please let me know if you need further analysis or assistance.
JUDGMENT :
Dinesh Maheshwari, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent as also damages for use and occupation, as filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the defendant-respondent, 1[Hereinafter, the parties have also been referred to as ‘the plaintiff’ or as ‘the defendant’, as per their status in the suit.], wherein the order dated 01.03.2017, as passed by the Trial Court striking off the defence of the defendant-respondent for failure to pay or deposit the due rent, which was approved by the Revisional Court in its order dated 18.01.2018, has been set aside by the High Court in its impugned order dated 02.11.2018.
3. The root question calling for determination in this appeal is as to whether the High Court was right in reversing the order striking off defence in terms of Order XV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,2[‘CPC’, for short.], as applicable to the present case,3[Rule 5 of Order XV was inserted to CPC for its application in the State of Uttar Pradesh by the Uttar Pradesh Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972; it was substituted by the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 w.e.f. 01.01.1977 an
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