K. Harilal, J.

1. This revision petition is filed challenging the concurrent findings of conviction entered and the sentence imposed on the revision petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the Nl Act') in Criminal Appeal No. 259/01 on the files of the Court of III Additional Sessions Judge (Ad hoc), Fast Track Court-I, Thrissur. The above appeal was filed challenging the judgment whereby the revision petitioner was found guilty of the said offence, passed in ST No. 3429/99 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Wadakkancherry. According to the impugned judgment, the revision petitioner stands sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay an amount of Rs. 38,000/- to the complainant as compensation, under Section 357(3) of the CrPC. The legality and propriety of the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence are under challenge in this revision petition. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The sole point raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that the complaint was not maintainable as the same was filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of refusal of the lawyer's notice. Going by the impugned judgment, it could be seen that the accused had refused to accept the lawyer's notice on 20/09/1999. The complaint was filed on 29/09/1999 and the cognizance was taken on the same day itself. Thus, factually the allegation stands undisputed.

3. Then, the question to be considered is, whether the complaint alleging commission of the offence under Section 138 of the Nl Act, filed immediately after the receipt of the returned notice, before the expiry of 15 days, on refusal of the notice by the drawer, is maintainable or not.

4. What is discernible on a close reading of Sections 138(b), 138(c) and 142(b) of the Nl Act, in juxtaposition, is that, where the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice under Section 138(b) of the Nl Act, the complaint must be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Nl Act. Thus, indisputably, the cause of action arises on the failure to make payment within fifteen days and the period of one month begins on the date on which the cause of action arises, i.e., fifteen days after the receipt of notice. The expression 'receipt' of the said notice employed in Section 138(c) of the Nl Act gets relevancy, where the notice had been duly served on the drawer of the cheque. It follows that, in case, the notice has been refused and returned, the expression 'receipt' loses its relevancy and the period of one month begins to run from the date on which the payee gets back the returned notice, since the cause of action would arise on that date. In short, the date of accrual of cause of action varies in accordance with the 'receipt' or 'refusal' of the notice, as the case may be.

5. In the above view point, I am of the opinion that 15 days' period provided for payment is applicable to the drawer, who received the notice only, and in the case where the drawer refused to accept the notice, the payee is not liable to wait for expiry of 15 days from the date of refusal to get the cause of action accrued. In the case where notice is received by the drawer, the cause of action arises only on the expiry of 15 days; whereas, in the case of 'refusal', the cause of action would arise on the day on which the payee gets back the returned notice on refusal by the drawer and the period of 30 days for filing the complaint begins to run from that day onwards. So, the complainant is justified in filing the complaint immediately after the receipt of the returned lawyer's notice, without waiting for the expiry of 15 days. In this analysis, I find that the complaint is maintainable under