Facts:

1. The petitioner, a Peon in the service of the fourth respondent Society, has faced disciplinary proceedings and earned a dismissal through Exhibit P11 order. He has impugned Exhibit P11, inter alia, on the ground that it was passed by an incompetent authority and that the order of dismissal is non est.

Scope of Adjudication:

2. Though the petitioner has raised various other issues, they may not, however, be germane for our consideration. In a judicial review, as is well-settled, the power of the management to inflict appropriate punishment on a delinquent employee can neither be cribbed nor curbed, provided the power is exercised by a proper authority. Without cavil, I may observe that the writ of certiorari can be exercised on certain well entrenched judicial parameters, such as ultra vires, disproportionality, perversity of finding, etc. In the present instance, the contention of the petitioner is that the capital punishment of removal from service was passed by an authority who is not clothed with any power. Simply stated, Exhibit P11 is ultra vires.

3. On the other hand, the respondent-Society has taken an objection against the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy.

4. The pleas raised by the rival parties to the lis obviate any reference to the merits of the matter on factual front, for both the issues are questions of law. If this Court is to accept the plea of either of the parties, it has to dispose of the writ petition on a technicality rather than on merit: That Exhibit P11 is ultra vires or that the writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy. Now, I may, thus, confine my discussion only to these twin aspects.

Summary of Submissions:

Petitioner’s:

5. On the issue of maintainability, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that, first, in Rule 198(3) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (‘the Rules’ for brevity), the authorities who can impose the punishment have been tabulated. In furtherance of his submissions, he has also submitted that as regards the petitioner, a Peon, the competent authority to impose the capital punishment of termination is the President, whereas Exhibit P11 order was passed by the Chairman of the disciplinary sub-committee.

6. On the issue whether the petitioner could have taken recourse to the judicial remedies provided under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (‘the Act’ for brevity), the learned counsel would contend that in terms of sub-rule (4) of Rule 198, first, an appeal shall lie to the Board of Management against the order of imposing penalty, say, removal from service. Only thereafter, if still aggrieved, can the affected employee approach the Arbitration Court under Section 69 of the Act.

7. Succinctly stated, it is the singular contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that once Exhibit P11 order of removal is ultra vires, in view of the fact that the Chairman of the disciplinary sub-committee has not been clothed with any power, the question of alternative remedy does not crop up. He has also underlined the fact that once the issue of vires has fallen for consideration, this Court can as well exercise its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the alternative remedy notwithstanding.

Respondent Society’s:

8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the fourth respondent Society has strenuously opposed the claims and contentions of the petitioner. The learned counsel has submitted that it hardly makes any difference whether the order of punishment is passed by either the Chairman of the disciplinary sub-committee or the President of the Managing Committee. The learned counsel has also contended that both the expressions ‘President’ and ‘Chairman’ have been used interchangeably and nothing much turns upon the nomenclature.

9. The pivot of the submission is that the petitioner has not been depri