A. P. SRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) THIS Full Bench has been constituted to consider the question

"whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by virtue of Section 242 of the U. P. Tenancy Act in respect of suit filed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act for obtaining) possession over agricultural land from which the plaintiff alleged his illegal dispossession within six months of the date of the-suit"

. The reference has been made by Mukherji, J. as he felt that there was a conflict between two division Bench decisions of this Court, the one being in the case of Ganga Din v. Gokul Prasad, 1951 All LJ 290: (AIR 1950 All 407) (A) and the other being an unreported decision in Jag narain v. Bhagwati Prasad, Civil Revn. No. 1548 of 1951 (since reported in 1957 All LJ 783: (AIR 1958 All 48} (B) and that it was desirable that the conflict be resolved.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel wanted to argue a point in connection with Section 40 (2) of the Land revenue Act also but we did not allow him to do so because only the question mentioned above has been referred to us.

( 3 ) THE plaintiff filed the suit on 30-11-1948 for possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief act alleging that they were in actual possession of the land in disoute (which was admittedly an agricultural land) but had been wrongfully dispossessed by the defendants otherwise than in accordance with law in November 1948. The defendants contested the suit and disputed the correctness of the plain-tiffs allegations. They said that they had themselves been in possession of the land as tenants of the plaintiff for more than 12 years. It was therefore not open to the plaintiffs to eject them. They also pleaded that the plaintiffs had filed the suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act only to evade the jurisdiction of the revenue court as the suit if filed there could never succeed.

( 4 ) THE learned Munsif rejected the plea of want of jurisdiction relying on the case of 1951 All LJ 290: (AIR 1950 All 407) (A ). On facts he accepted the plaintiffs case and rejected that of the defendants, He therefore decreed the suit. The defendants then filed the application in revision out of which the present reference has arisen and it was contended on their behalf that the view taken by the learned Munsif about the applicability of Section 242 of the U. P. Tenancy Act was not justified and the case on which he relied in support of that view had not been correctly decided. The learned counsel sought support for his contention from the decision in Civil Revn. No. 1548 of 1951: (AIR 1958 All 48) (B ).

( 5 ) FIVE contentions, some of which clearly over- lap each other, were urged by the learned counsel for the applicants in support of the plea that the plaintiffs suit was cognizable only by the Revenue court. They are:

(1) Section 242 of the U. P. Tenancy Act is wide in its scope and imperative in nature. The history of the enactment shows that it has always been the intention of the Legislature to keep the revenue court as the only forum in which all disputes relating to agricultural land should be triable. Whenever courts made an attempt by interpreting the law to give concurrent or alternative jurisdiction in such matters to the civil court, the Legislature intervened and made bar excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court more stringent and comprehensive. Whatever may be the nature of the dispute, therefore, if it relates to agricultural land and can in any way be considered to be of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule of the U. P. Tenancy act, the revenue court alone is entitled to hear it. No other court can have jurisdiction to entertain it. While enacting Section 242 of the U. P. Tenancy Act the Legislature made no exception in favour of suits filed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiffs cannot therefore be allowed to escape the bar of Section 242 simply by framing the suit as one under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act.

(2) As Section 2

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