MOOTHAM, C.J. :- This is an application under S. 115, Civil P.C. for the revision of a judgment of the learned Civil Judge of Lucknow dated 5-1-1955. The circumstances in which the application is made, as found by the learned Judge, are these :

Some years prior to the year 1950 the applicant became the tenant of the first floor of premises No. 30, Hazratganj, Lucknow for which he paid a monthly rent of Rs. 137/8/-. In August 1950 the applicant, with the permission of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, sub-let a portion of this floor to the Reliable Water Supply Services of India Limited (herein called the Supply Company) at a rental of Rs. 75/- a month.

In January 1932 the Lakshmi Insurance Company Limited (herein called the Insurance Company) purchased the entire premises No. 30, Hazratganj, from the then owners. Up to that date the rent of the first floor amounting to Rs. 137/8/- had been paid by the applicant to the then owners of the premises, but from February 1952 the applicant paid to the Insurance Company Rs. 62/8/- a month and the Supply Company paid as rent the sum of Rs. 75/- a month.

2. On 13-10-1953, the Supply Company vacated the portion of the first floor occupied by it, and delivered vacant possession to a firm of contractors who had been engaged by the Insurance Company to effect certain alterations in the premises. The applicant and certain other tenants objected to the work which was being done by the contractors and on 21-10-1953, without the knowledge of the Insurance Company, the applicant took forcible possession of the premises which had been vacated by the Supply Company and has since remained in occupation thereof.

3. The Insurance Company then filed a suit against the applicant under S. 9, Specific Relief Act for recovery of possession of that portion of the first floor from which it had been ousted by the applicant, and by the judgment which is the subject of the present application that suit was decreed with costs.

4. The applicants contention in this Court is that as the Supply Company was his sub-tenant he was entitled to take possession of the premises occupied by that Company when it vacated them in October, 1953; that as the Insurance Company had no right to possession it became, when possession was in fact delivered to it by the Supply Company, a mere trespasser and as such could not file a suit under S. 9, and that the learned Civil Judge in entertaining the suit accordingly exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law.

The assertions of fact upon which this argument is founded are denied by the Insurance Company whose contention is that in February 1952, very shortly after that Company had purchased the building, it was agreed between the Insurance Company, the applicant and the Supply Company that the applicant and the Supply Company should thenceforth be the tenant of the Insurance Company of so much of the first floor of the building as was occupied by each of them respectively.

Effect, it is said, was given to this agreement and consequently it was the Insurance Company and not the applicant who was entitled to possession of the portion of the first floor occupied by the Supply Company when that Company vacated it in October, 1953. The learned Judge did not think it necessary to record a finding on this question, and indeed no issue was framed on the point.

It appears from the judgment that the applicants contention in the lower Court was that the Insurance Company never in fact entered into possession of the premises after the Supply Company had vacated them, or that if it had done so it was by force or fraud, and that he in any case had not dispossessed the Insurance Company.

5. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, so far as it is material, provides that

"If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title tha