The central legal point established in the judgment is the court's authority to reconsider the sentence based on the delay in the revision process and the nature of the offense, while also highlighting the application of Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in determining the appropriate sentence.

This revision is directed against the order dated 24-5-1983 passed by the Sessions Judge, Shahjahanpur, dismissing the appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 30-8-19x2 passed by the Judicial Magistrate of Special Court, Shahjahanpur convicting the revisionist under Section 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment of six month sand fine of Rs. 1000/ -.

2. Heard learned counsel for the revisionist and learned Addiiional Government Advocate.

3. I find no merit in (lie revision as regards the conviction is concerned. However, this revision is pending since 1983 and the adulteration was made on 11-1-1979.

4. In view of the facts and circumstan ces of the case that the alleged adulteration was made in the year 1979 it would not be proper to send the accused to jail after such a long time, more so when he had served out at least few days sentence after his conviction. The Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. K. Rajeshwar Rao, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 365; 1992 JIC 108 (SC), altered the sentence of imprisonment to sentence of fine on the ground that 15 years had passed by from the date of of fence and at this distance of time the ends of justice may not be served by sending the respondent to imprisonment: more so when he has undergone all these years the agony of the prosecution.

5. The offence in the case before the Supreme Court had occurred on March 13, 1976 before the Amending Act came into force. The Supreme Court observed that under the unamended Act it was not man datory to impose the minimum sentence. This decisions, therefore, not applicable to the offences which occurred after the Amending Act came into force. Since the legislation has done away with the discretion of the Courts to award either sentences of imprisonment or fine and minimum sentence has been prescribed the Courts have been left with no discretion but to award minimum or any sentence up to maximum limit prescribed. In my opinion, if the legislation requires that on an of fence being proved at least minimum sen tence of imprisonment has to be awarded and the Courts cannot overlook the legisla tive mandate and award sentence of fine only though on equity it may feel justified to lake

lenient view. However, Courts can convert sentence of rigorous imprisonment into sentence of simple imprisonment.

6. Though the Courts have got no power to refuse to award minimum sen tence of imprisonment yet under Clause (d) of Section 433 of Code of Criminal Procedure "the appropriate Government" is empowered to commute the sentence of simple imprisonment and to impose fine.

7. It is open to Stale Government to take lenient view considering the nature of the offence and circumstances, specially the sentence awarded long before, could not be implemented on account of delayed disposal of revision, or appeal may com mute the sentence. In view of this legal position the Supreme Court in N. Sukumaran Nair v. Food Inspector, Mavelikara, reported in (1977) 9 SCC 101, considering the delayed disposal found the case appropriate for commutation of sentence and directed the appellant to deposit in the trial Court a sum of Rs. 6,000/- as fine in commutation of the sentence of six months simple imprisonment, within a period of six weeks and intimate to the appropriate Government that such fine has been deposited. On deposit of such fine, the Supreme Court observed that the State Government may form alise the mat ter by passing appropriate orders under clause (d) of Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

8. On similar consideration the Supreme Court in Badri Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1996 SCC (Criminal) 79, passed the following order:-

"there is some scope, however, towards the sentence because this Court granted in 108) leave and the appellant is on hail. We would rather now scale down the sentence of six-months R. I. to three months simple imprison ment, while sustaining the fine