The negligence demonstrated by the appellants constituted a breach of statutory duty, failing to follow the established Accreditation Guidelines, thereby harming the respondent.

JUDGMENT

Nor Bee Ariffin JCA:

Introduction

[1] The respondent owns and manages Lincoln University College (LUC), (formerly known as Lincoln College (LC) pursuant to a license granted under the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act 1996 (Act 555).

[2] The 1st appellant is a statutory body created under the Medical Act 1971 (Act 50) and regulates medical profession in Malaysia. The 1st defendant is also responsible for the recognition of medical degrees awarded by local and foreign universities and the registration of medical practitioners.

[3] The respondent's claims against the appellants for negligence, breach of statutory duty and misfeasance in public office were based on the breaches of the Guidelines of the Accreditation of Malaysian Undergraduate Medical Education Programmes (Accreditation Guidelines), the provisions of the Malaysian Qualifications Agency 2007 (Act 679) and Act 50 in the process and conduct of evaluation of its local medical degree programme (MQA/PA 0927) and two of its offshore medical degree programmes (MQA/PA 1561 and MQA/PA 1562).

[4] The respondent's claims centred around two survey visits undertaken by a panel appointed by a body known as Joint Technical Committee for Accreditation (JTC). The two survey panel visits were conducted on 13 May 2011 and 14 May 2011 and 27 May 2011 (the First Survey Panel Visits) and on 29 April 2013 and 30 April 2013 (the Second Survey Panel Visits).

[5] On both occasions, the Survey Panels were chaired by the 2nd appellant who was a member of the 1st appellant at the material time.

[6] The parties have filed the statement of agreed facts as between them which we find to be comprehensive, covering the facts and events that had taken place in the dispute. We adopt the same and we do not think it is necessary to reproduced them.

Proceedings In The High Court

[7] The trial of the action in the High Court proceeded on the question of liability only. The learned Judge ruled that the Court would proceed to hear and determine issues relating to damages if liability was established.

[8] After a full trial of the action, the learned Judge found the defendants liable in all three causes of action against them and allowed the plaintiff's claim. The learned Judge directed that damages be assessed before him.

[9] The learned Judge had, as apparent from his Ground of judgment (GOJ), undertaken an extensive analysis of the evidence presented before him in arriving at his decision in allowing all claims by the plaintiff for negligence, breach of statutory duty and misfeasance in public office which are assailed by the defendants in this appeal. The defendants presented 27 grounds in challenging the decision.

[10] The parties in this Judgment are referred to as they were in the High Court.

Decision Of This Court

Appellate Intervention

[11] It is well settled law that an appellate Court would be slow to disturb a trial Court finding of facts unless the decision is shown to be plainly wrong (Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors, 2004 MarsdenLR 2024 ; Ming Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd v. Syed Azahari Noh Shahabudin & Anor; [2010] 4 MLJ 577; [2010] 6 CLJ 857; U [2010] 2 MLRA 668; [SUPP] 2018 MLJ 363; [2010] 9 CLJ 785; Dream Property Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd; [2015] 2 MLJ 441; [2015] 2 CLJ 453; [2015] 2 AMR 601.)

[12] The Federal Court recently restated the plainly wrong test for appellate intervention in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng & Ors, [2020] 12 MLJ 67. Zabariah Yusuf FCJ delivering the decision of the Court held as follows:

"[148... As long as the trial judges conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate Court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts.

[151] It