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Eight Years of Required, Not Current Duty Charge:
In a significant ruling clarifying the distinction between "service" and "" for promotions under service rules, the has held that the period spent by an employee on cannot be counted as "" where the governing regulation mandates a prescribed number of years of in the cadre.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Harsimran Singh Sethi and Justice Minderjeet Yadav allowed an appeal by the , setting aside a Single Judge order that had directed the counting of CDC tenure for promotion eligibility. The Court emphasized that service rendered on a stop-gap basis before does not satisfy the requirement of "" under the relevant statute.
The Dispute Over Promotion Eligibility
The respondent, Sanjeev Batish, joined as a Junior Engineer in 1996 and was transferred to the in 2004. While working as a Junior Engineer, he was assigned the Current Duty Charge of Sub-Divisional Engineer (Mechanical) on , continuing in his own pay scale and rank. He was later promoted on a regular basis as Sub-Divisional Engineer (Mechanical) on .
When his case for further promotion to Executive Engineer (Mechanical) came up for consideration, Batish claimed that the period from August 2011 to May 2020—spent on Current Duty Charge—should be treated as service in the cadre for computing the eight-year requirement stipulated under Section 6 of the .
The State rejected this claim via an order dated , holding that the eight-year period could only commence from the date of . Batish challenged this before a Single Judge, who allowed his petition by relying on the 's decision in . The State appealed.
Arguments: "Service" vs. ""
The State, represented by , contended that the Single Judge had misread the rule. The requirement under Section 6 of the 2009 Act is "" in the cadre, not merely "." Mr. Mittal argued that while the CDC period could be considered as , it could not be equated with service for the purpose of satisfying a statutory eligibility condition.
On the other hand, Batish's counsel, , submitted that since promotions can be made against officiating vacancies, the gained on Current Duty Charge should be treated as valid service. He further argued that the absence of additional salary during CDC did not detract from the value of the work performed.
Court's Legal Analysis: Stop-Gap Cannot Be Substantive
The Division Bench examined the relevant provision— Section 6 of the 2009 Act —which states:
"No person shall be appointed to the Service... unless he... in case of an appointment by promotion from Group B Service, has... and passed the departmental examination of Group B Service."
The Explanation to the section clarifies that "" includes service rendered in both Group B and Group A.
Drawing a critical distinction, the Court observed that the Act defines a "member of service" as an officer appointed substantively to a . The Current Duty Charge assigned to Batish in 2011 was not a but a stop-gap arrangement.
"The Current Duty Charge itself mean a for a particular period in a higher cadre. The Current Duty Charge given in own rank and pay of Junior Engineer cannot be treated as a to a even against an ."(Para 24)
The Bench noted that had the CDC been treated as a , there would have been no need for a fresh order in May 2020. The fact that Batish received all cadre benefits only from May 2020 further confirmed that his substantive entry into the cadre occurred at that date.
Distinguishing the Vipin Gupta Precedent
The Single Judge had relied heavily on , where the held that gained on Current Duty Charge could be considered for promotion. However, the Division Bench clarified that Vipin Gupta dealt with a rule requiring "" in the post, not "" . The two concepts are fundamentally different.
"Wherever, the requisite is needed for promotion to a particular post, rendered even on Current Duty Charge will be a valid , however, where the Rules prescribe completed 08 years’ service in the particular cadre, the requirement necessarily relates to requisite service rendered by an employee after to that cadre."(Para 30)
Thus, the Single Judge erred in importing a principle from a rule-set that was not analogous.
Final Decision: Appeal Allowed, Single Judge Order Set Aside
The Division Bench concluded that the interpretation given by the Single Judge
"cannot be sustained in the eyes of law."
It set aside the order dated
and restored the State's speaking order dated
, which had denied Batish's claim.
The Court clarified that Batish would be entitled to further promotion only after completing eight years of regular service in the cadre of Sub-Divisional Engineer (Mechanical), unless the Government exercises its power of relaxation under the proviso to Section 6.
"The respondent would be entitled to claim further promotion only after completing eight years regular service in the cadre of Sub-Divisional Engineer (Mechanical), unless the prescribed period is relaxed by the Government by passing an appropriate order in accordance with law."(Para 31)
The judgment reinforces the principle that where statutory rules prescribe a specific period of service (as opposed to ) for eligibility, that service must be counted only from the date of to the cadre, not from earlier .
