Enquiry Report By Sitting Judge In Administrative Capacity Not Judicial Order: Calcutta High Court

The Calcutta High Court has made a crucial distinction between administrative and judicial functions, ruling that a disciplinary enquiry report prepared by a sitting judge in an administrative capacity does not constitute a judicial order. Consequently, a writ petition challenging such a report does not warrant hearing by a Bench of two or more judges.

The Controversy: A Judge's Report Under Challenge

Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra was hearing a writ petition filed by Rajender Kumar Dudeja, who was aggrieved by disciplinary proceedings and an enquiry report prepared against him. As the court began issuing directions for the exchange of affidavits, the petitioner raised a preliminary objection: he argued that the matter should not be heard by a single judge but must be placed before a larger Bench of two or more judges.

Petitioner's Plea for Larger Bench

Mr. Dudeja, appearing in person, invoked Chapter V Rule 2 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court. He contended that a single judge can refer a matter to a larger Bench if it can be heard "more advantageously" by two or more judges. His principal ground was that the enquiry report under challenge had been authored by a sitting judge of the High Court. According to him, judicial propriety and discipline demanded that a single judge should not deliberate on a report prepared by another single judge. He further argued that the matter involved "serious questions of law" and relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary & Ors. (2024) to support his claim.

High Court Administration's Counter

Opposing the plea, Mr. Joydip Kar , senior advocate representing the High Court administration, submitted that Chapter V Rule 2 is not a mandatory provision but a directory guideline . It applies only where a situation genuinely warrants a larger Bench , such as conflicting Division Bench judgments. He emphasized that the enquiry report was prepared by the judge in his administrative capacity , not in the exercise of judicial functions. "This is not even a quasi-judicial action ," he argued, adding that treating it as a judicial order from which an appeal would lie would be erroneous. He also noted that the order dated 27th April 2026 was passed at an ad interim stage without affidavits, and the matter had never been finally heard by the earlier coordinate Bench .

Court's Ruling: Administrative vs. Judicial Acts

Justice Mitra rejected the petitioner's submission, holding that Chapter V Rule 2 is not a mandate but a directory guideline. A single judge may refer a matter to a larger Bench only upon finding that it can be heard more advantageously by such a Bench.

The court clarified the nature of the enquiry report, stating:

"However, it is not as if this Court is sitting in appeal over a judicial order passed by another Single Judge . This is impermissible in law and would result in judicial indiscipline."

The judge drew a sharp line between administrative and judicial functions:

"This enquiry report has been made by a learned Single Judge in his administrative capacity . This is not a judicial order ."

Further elaborating, the court held:

"The enquiry report is merely the communication of a finding by an enquiry authority and not a judicial pronouncement of any Judge, discharging judicial function."

The court also noted that the petitioner had not raised the issue of a larger Bench before the earlier coordinate Bench, despite claiming to have made elaborate submissions on merits.

Precedent Distinguished

While the court respectfully agreed with the proposition in Mary Pushpam , it held that the ratio had no application. That judgment concerned a judicial order and the binding effect of precedent, whereas the present case involved only an enquiry report prepared in an administrative capacity.

Final Decision and Directions

Finding no ground to conclude that the matter could be heard more advantageously by a Bench of two or more judges, Justice Mitra ruled:

"In view of the afore-stated, I hold that the instant petition should be heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court."

The court directed the respondent to file its affidavit-in-opposition by October 15, 2026, with the petitioner permitted to file a reply by November 13, 2026. The matter was listed for final hearing on November 20, 2026.

The judgment serves as a clear reminder that the nature of the act—administrative or judicial—determines the appropriate forum and procedure, and that the mere authorship of a report by a sitting judge does not elevate it to a judicial pronouncement demanding larger Bench consideration.