Erroneous Invocation of Section 125A RPA at Cognizance Stage Held Curable: Supreme Court of India

In a significant ruling regarding criminal procedure, the Supreme Court of India has clarified that a Magistrate’s error in taking cognizance under an incorrect legislative provision does not automatically vitiate the proceedings, provided the court maintains the requisite jurisdiction to address the underlying offence.

The bench, comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, addressed a petition filed by Chandrikaben Kishor Dafda, who had challenged criminal proceedings initiated against her for alleged suppression of assets in her 2015 municipal election affidavit.

The Background of the Dispute The legal battle originated from a private complaint filed by one Velji Namori Maheshwari, who alleged that the appellant had failed to disclose multiple agricultural properties owned by her husband during her bid for a councillor seat in the Bhuj municipal elections. Following this, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Gandhidham took cognizance of the matter under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), and issued summons to the appellant.

Mrs. Dafda sought to quash the order before the High Court of Gujarat, arguing that the RPA specifically pertains to Parliamentary and Assembly elections and is inapplicable to local body polls. However, the High Court declined to set aside the proceedings, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court.

Challenging the Scope of Election Law Before the Supreme Court, the appellant’s counsel reiterated the jurisdictional overlap, asserting that the RPA does not govern municipal elections, which fall under the purview of state legislation. Furthermore, defense counsel argued that the Gujarat Municipalities (Conduct of Elections) Amendment Rules 2005 do not obligate a candidate to disclose assets held solely by a spouse.

The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the latter claim. Examining the affidavit format, the bench clarified that the duty to disclose extends to assets of the candidate, their spouse, and dependents. It emphasized that the phrasing of the disclosure rule is intended to be inclusive, and punctuation within the prescribed affidavit should not be misinterpreted to create exclusions for sole-ownership assets.

Cognizance as a Curable Irregularity The core legal question focused on whether citing the wrong statute (RPA) at the point of cognizance rendered the Magistrate's Order null and void. Relying on Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court held that cognizance is taken of an "offence" rather than the specific statutory section.

Justice Karol, writing for the bench, underscored that as long as the magistrate has the power to take cognizance of the alleged offence, an error naming the wrong act is a "curable irregularity." The Court noted that such errors do not necessitate quashing unless they result in a "failure of justice."

Key Observations The judgment highlighted the importance of preserving the integrity of the election process: * "It is a well-settled principle of law that cognizance is taken of the offence and not people." * "The error in taking cognizance under the wrong Section is, in fact, a curable defect so long as the Court that has taken cognizance has the power to take cognizance of the other Sections also." * "If the issue is that a false affidavit has been filed in the electoral process, that is an offence against society at large and has to be investigated."

The Road Ahead Rather than quashing the case, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Magistrate. The order mandates that the lower court take fresh cognizance under the proper legal provisions—likely referring to relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code, such as those regarding filing false information before a public servant—and proceed in accordance with the law.

This decision serves as a stern reminder that while procedural correctness is vital, minor technical errors at the threshold of a trial will not act as a shield for those accused of substantive offences against public trust.