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Cannot Reopen Issues Settled by Final Decree:
In a significant ruling reinforcing the limited scope of , the has held that an cannot or issues that have already been adjudicated by the trial and appellate courts and have . Justice Virender Singh dismissed a petition filed by challenging an order appointing a to execute a 99-year in favor of
A Decree Finalized: The Journey from Trial to Execution
The dispute originated in when filed a suit for of a lease agreement and concerning 11 kanals of land in Hamirpur. The trial court initially granted only the injunction relief, but the First Appellate Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal in , directing the defendants to execute and register a in terms of the agreement. The decree after a by defendant Ram Piari was dismissed for want of prosecution in .
When the initiated in , the —Subhash Chand and others—filed objections, primarily arguing that permission under was required and that the proposed 99-year lease was legally impermissible. The rejected these objections and appointed a to execute the deed, prompting the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Objections Raised: Section 118 Permission and Lease Duration
The contended that the had failed to ensure compliance with , particularly the need for permission under before transferring land to a non-agriculturist. They argued that the had not placed the original permission on record and that the draft was premature. They also objected to the 99-year lease term, claiming that a limited leases to 30 years.
The countered that permission had already been granted by the government via letter dated , and that the draft explicitly referenced this permission. They further argued that the objections had been considered and rejected by the trial and appellate courts and could not be at the execution stage.
High Court's Firm Stance: Cannot Act as an
Justice Virender Singh emphasized the limited under Article 227, citing the 's decisions in and to underscore that the High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own findings unless the lower court's order is . The Court then examined whether the 's order suffered from perversity.
The Court observed that the
' objections—regarding Section 118 permission,
,
, and
—had already been adjudicated by the trial and appellate courts.
"The learned
has
/
those averments… as the suit of the plaintiff-
has been decreed, which has
,"
the judge remarked.
Key Observations: ''
The Court noted that the
had obtained the requisite permission under
, as evidenced by the draft
referencing the government's letter.
"The permission from the Government, under Section 118… is not available to the
,"
the Court stated, rejecting the objection as baseless. On the lease duration, the Court held that since the
provided for a 99-year lease, the
correctly rejected the objection.
The Court further clarified that mere lack of detailed reasoning in the
's order did not render it
.
"Only the said deficiency does not justify the interference by this Court, in the exercise of its
, under
, which is inherently limited in scope."
Final Decision: Petition Dismissed
The High Court concluded that the had acted within its jurisdiction in rejecting the objections and appointing a . The petition was dismissed, and the parties were directed to appear before the on for further proceedings. The judgment reinforces the principle that once a decree attains , executing courts cannot be used as a forum to reopen settled issues, ensuring that the 's rights are not frustrated by endless objections.
