Five-Year Tribunal Term Under Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026 Disincentivizes Talent: Arvind Datar

In a incisive critique of the newly enacted Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, senior advocate and legal commentator Arvind Datar has warned that the five-year fixed term for tribunal members will continue to deter experienced lawyers from joining the quasi-judicial bodies. Drawing on a three-decade-old Supreme Court precedent, Datar argues that the limited tenure fundamentally undermines the efficiency and reputation of India’s tribunal system.

A Flaw at the Heart of the Reforms

The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, which governs the appointment and conditions of service for members of various tribunals including the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, and others, retains the five-year term initially introduced in earlier legislation. Datar calls this “the most regrettable feature” of the new Act. “At the end of the five years, a member has to offer himself for reappointment,” he notes, pointing out that despite assurances given by the Attorney-General in the past, it is not known if any reappointment has actually been made.

The practical consequence, according to Datar, is a serious disincentive for competent lawyers to apply for selection: “No lawyer with the necessary domain expertise and having a reasonably good practice will leave his practice to become a member for five years.” The problem is compounded by the rule that after completing a term, a former member cannot appear before that same tribunal again. For example, a company lawyer who serves on the NCLT for five years would be effectively barred from practicing company law thereafter, because the jurisdiction of civil courts is excluded for almost all company matters.

A Supreme Court Warning Ignored

Datar highlights that the Supreme Court itself had flagged this issue nearly forty years ago in the landmark case of SP Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 124. In that judgment, Justice P.N. Bhagwati observed that a five-year tenure would be a disincentive for well-qualified members to accept the offer to join any tribunal. Further, many new members take at least two years to master a particular branch of law, only to be forced to step down just when they have become fully acquainted with the legal issues that need consideration.

The wisdom of the Supreme Court’s observation remains relevant today. Datar argues that the working of tribunals over the last twenty years has demonstrated that the limited tenure has not attracted the right talent. “Today, the Technical Members are mainly from the Indian Revenue Service or other civil services. On the judicial side, it is mostly retired district judges who apply,” he states. This pattern, he contends, has “seriously damaged the efficiency and reputation of most of the Tribunals.”

The Case for Automatic Reappointment

Datar proposes a simple reform: automatic reappointment for a further term of five years unless there are serious allegations of irregularity. The logic is compelling. A tribunal member who has developed expertise in the first term can leverage that knowledge to dispose of a higher number of cases in the succeeding term. Moreover, well-reasoned tribunal orders that carefully consider statutory provisions would “make the task of the High Courts and the Supreme Court much simpler.”

He calls for a minimum term of ten years for important tribunals, noting that without such a change, “it will be impossible to have a proper Tribunal system.” The old system of retired bureaucrats and retired judges being appointed will continue, perpetuating mediocrity.

Implications for the Legal Profession

For practicing lawyers, the five-year rule creates a stark career calculus. Joining a tribunal means effectively ending one’s practice in that specialized area after a single term. This is particularly acute for fields like company law, tax law, and intellectual property, where tribunals exercise exclusive jurisdiction. The Act, therefore, not only discourages fresh talent from applying but also wastes the investment of those who do join, as they are forced to leave just when they become most productive.

From a systemic perspective, the limited tenure undermines the very purpose of establishing tribunals—to provide speedy, expert adjudication. If members lack deep, sustained expertise and institutional memory, the quality of decisions suffers, leading to more appeals and further delays. The Supreme Court, in the Sampath Kumar case, had envisioned tribunals as effective substitutes for High Court jurisdiction, but that vision remains unrealized.

A Call for Legislative Reconsideration

Datar’s commentary is a timely reminder that while the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, may have modernized certain aspects of tribunal governance, it has retained a fatal flaw. Legislators must urgently consider amending the Act to provide for longer terms and automatic reappointment, thereby attracting the best legal minds to the tribunals.

Until then, India’s tribunal system risks remaining a career graveyard for promising lawyers and a source of frustration for litigants seeking justice. As Datar concludes, “It is unfathomable as to why there is insistence on the five-year term.” The answer, perhaps, lies in a lack of political will to break the cycle of short-sighted policy-making.

The legal community will be watching closely to see if the government heeds this warning or allows the tribunals to languish further.