Rules Mere Occupation of Government Land Does Not Confer Right to Settlement
In a significant ruling that clarifies the limits of over public land, the has held that long-standing occupation of government land does not automatically entitle a person to settlement. Justice Devashis Baruah, while partly allowing a writ petition from Dr. Maushumi Barooah, quashed an eviction notice that was issued without following , but firmly stated that the petitioner could not claim a right to the land merely because she had been using it for years.
The Dispute Over a Strip of Land
The petitioner and her husband had purchased a plot measuring 1 Katha 10 Lechas under Dag No. 99 in Guwahati’s Ulubari Mouza in . For access to their property, they relied on an adjoining strip of government land — Dag No. 732 — measuring 10.38 Lechas. They had been using this passage since the purchase and claimed their vendors had used it since .
In , the petitioner’s husband applied for settlement of this government land, but the application remained pending. Then, on , the Circle Officer issued a notice under , directing the petitioner’s husband to vacate the land within three days. The notice referred to both Dag Nos. 688 and 732, though the petitioner only occupied Dag No. 732.
Arguments: Natural Justice vs.
Senior counsel for the petitioner, , argued that the notice was procedurally flawed because no show-cause opportunity was given, and that the application for settlement was still pending. He contended that the petitioner had a to the land.
On the other side, , representing the fourth respondent, and state counsel argued that the land had been earmarked for road purposes as early as — well before the petitioner’s purchase. They claimed the petitioner’s encroachment had narrowed the public road, and that under the , settlement could not be granted merely on the basis of occupation.
Court Quashes Notice, Upholds Policy
The High Court found that the eviction notice was unsustainable. “The said notice is not only contrary to , but also violates the ,” Justice Baruah observed, noting that the petitioner was admittedly in possession and should have been heard before being ordered to vacate.
However, the court drew a sharp distinction between possession and entitlement. “This Court also cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that merely being in occupation of Government land, there is no conferment of right to be allotted the land. At best, it may be a case wherein the Petitioner or her husband could be considered for allotment subject to the land policy and ,” the judgment stated.
The court referred to , which explicitly states that the government will not consider settlement of government land in Guwahati or other town areas solely on the ground of occupation, regardless of how long the person has been in possession.
A Balanced Approach: Access Without Ownership
On examining the trace map, the court observed that the government land appeared to be the only means of to the petitioner’s property. Justice Baruah suggested a pragmatic solution: “If the Government land in question cannot be settled with the Petitioner's husband, the authorities can very well provide a passage to the Petitioner for to the Petitioner's land inasmuch as the said is reserved for road.”
Since the fourth respondent disputed that this was the only access, the court left the factual determination to the revenue authorities, stating they would be the best judge.
The Final Order
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with several directions:
- The impugned eviction notice dated was set aside and quashed.
- The petitioner was granted liberty to submit a fresh application for settlement of Dag No. 732 through the Sewa Setu portal within 30 days, provided the land was recorded as waste land.
- The authorities were directed to consider the application in light of the , and to determine whether the petitioner had any other access to her property.
- The setting aside of the notice would not bar the authorities from taking fresh eviction proceedings in accordance with law, following the principles laid down in .
The interim order protecting the petitioner from eviction was vacated, and no costs were imposed.
This judgment reinforces a key legal principle: long possession of public land, without more, creates no — but must still be observed before eviction.