GREF Personnel Face Dual Disciplinary Control Under Army Act and CCS Rules: J&K High Court

Disciplinary authorities hold the discretion to choose between the Army Act or the CCS (CCA) Rules when proceeding against GREF/BRO personnel , the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has ruled while dismissing a writ petition challenging a Memorandum of Charges against a Border Roads Organisation officer.

Justice Sanjay Dhar, presiding over a Single Bench, held that members of the General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) operate under a dual disciplinary framework — one prescribed under the Army Act, 1950, and the other under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 — with the choice of proceeding resting entirely with the competent disciplinary authority.

The Charges That Sparked the Challenge

The petitioner, Badavath Kishan , an Executive Engineer (Civil) holding a rank equivalent to Major, was served a Memorandum of Charges dated 27 February 2025 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The charges alleged that while posted as Officer Commanding of 81 RCC/762 BRTF (P) Vijayak between November 2019 and March 2022, he had entered into illegal financial transactions with a CPL/Mazdoor deployed within his unit's area of responsibility.

Specifically, the petitioner was accused of inappropriately receiving ₹4.50 lakh through cash and digital payments from CPL Mazdoor Alauddin Ansari — a person with whom he had official dealings — in violation of Rule 16(4)(i)(a) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Bank statements obtained from Axis Bank and State Bank of India allegedly corroborated the transactions, including a ₹1 lakh transfer made on 4 June 2021.

Petitioner's Challenge: Three Prongs

The petitioner's counsel, Mr. Tapas Das , advanced three primary grounds for quashing the Memorandum of Charges. First, he argued that the preceding Court of Inquiry violated the mandatory provisions of Rule 180 of the Army Rules, 1954, which requires that an affected person be present throughout the inquiry, permitted to cross-examine witnesses, and allowed to produce defence evidence. Second, he contended that the charges were vague and based on surmises and conjectures. Third, he alleged that the charges had been served belatedly.

The respondents, represented by Deputy Advocate General Mr. Hakim Aman Ali , countered that the writ petition was premature since the inquiry was yet to commence, and the petitioner could raise his defence during the departmental proceedings.

Dual Disciplinary Framework: The Court's Analysis

The Court carefully examined the statutory position of GREF personnel, tracing the framework established by SRO 329 and SRO 330 of 1960, which applied specified provisions of the Army Act, 1950, and Army Rules, 1954, to GREF members for disciplinary purposes. Directly recruited GREF personnel are simultaneously governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and certain provisions of the Army Act.

Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in R. Viswan v. Union of India (1983) and Mohammad Ansari v. Union of India (2017) , the Court clarified the practical application of this dual framework. Grave offences — such as those committed in relation to an enemy, offences on active service, mutiny, or desertion — may warrant proceedings under the Army Act, including trial by Court Martial. Less grave disciplinary matters, however, may be dealt with under the CCS (CCA) Rules.

Applying this framework, the Court found that the alleged financial misconduct with a subordinate was "not of a grave nature," justifying the disciplinary authority's choice to proceed under the CCS (CCA) Rules rather than the Army Act. Consequently, even assuming non-compliance with Rule 180 of the Army Rules during the Court of Inquiry , this was not fatal to the departmental proceedings initiated under the 1965 Rules — a position that distinguished the precedents cited by the petitioner, which concerned cases where personnel were actually tried under the Army Act.

Judicial Review at the Charge-Framing Stage

The Court also rejected the vagueness challenge, observing that the statement of articles of charges contained full particulars: the specific amount received, the identity of the individual involved, the relevant time period, and the details of corroborating bank statements. The Court invoked Union of India v. Upendra Singh (1994) to emphasise the limited scope of judicial review at this preliminary stage:

"It is only if the charges framed are contrary to any law or the same are absolutely vague so as to prevent the delinquent official from making an effective defence to the same that the Court can interfere."

On the delay argument, the Court noted that the transactions pertained to 2021–2022 and that a Court of Inquiry was conducted before the charges were framed in February 2025. There was no undue delay in the circumstances.

The Decision

Dismissing the writ petition as devoid of merit, the Court vacated the interim order and declined to interfere at the charge-framing stage. The ruling reinforces that disciplinary authorities retain broad discretion in determining the applicable procedural framework for GREF personnel and that writ courts will not second-guess such choices absent clear legal infirmity or vagueness in the charges. The departmental inquiry against the petitioner will now proceed under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.