Grievous Injury Not Necessary For Attempt To Murder Under Section 307 IPC: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has clarified that a grievous or life-threatening injury is not a necessary ingredient for attracting Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with attempt to murder. The Court, however, refused to add the charge in a case where the petitioner sought it at a late stage, as no allegation of intention or knowledge to kill had been raised earlier.

A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran delivered the ruling in Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors. , dismissing a Special Leave Petition that challenged the concurrent refusal of lower courts to alter the charge.

When a Waterlogging Dispute Turned Violent

The case arose from an altercation over waterlogging caused by the drainage of rainwater. The petitioner, his brother, and his uncle were allegedly assaulted by armed men, resulting in multiple injuries. An FIR was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 325, and 506 IPC at Police Station Nissing, Karnal, against six accused. Notably, Section 307 was initially included but later dropped during investigation after the accused requested a medical board examination.

The petitioner’s brother sustained a fracture of the right parietal bone with an underlying haemorrhagic contusion. A neurosurgeon from a private hospital, examined as PW5, opined that the injury could have been dangerous to life. However, a Medical Board from the Government Medical College, Karnal, subsequently concluded that while the injuries were grievous, they were not life-threatening.

The Medical Evidence Conflict

After the prosecution witnesses were examined, the petitioner moved an application to alter the charge to include Section 307 IPC. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karnal, dismissed the application, holding that the Medical Board’s report prevailed over the private neurosurgeon’s opinion. The Sessions Court upheld this, additionally noting that the first informant had not alleged that the accused attacked with an intention to kill. The High Court agreed, reasoning that the Government Medical College’s opinion superseded that of the private hospital.

What Section 307 Really Requires

The Supreme Court began by examining the statutory language of Section 307. The provision has two limbs concerning punishment but only one standard of culpability—whether the act was done with such intention or knowledge that, had it caused death, the perpetrator would be guilty of murder.

“We are of the opinion that the grievousness of the injuries or the possibility of injury which could have led to death, is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307,” the Court observed.

The Court explained that hurt, whether simple or grievous, is not a precondition. The first limb punishes the act with intent, while the second provides a graver punishment when hurt is actually caused. The crucial element is the mental state.

Relying on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kashiram (2009) 4 SCC 26, the Court reiterated that a conviction under Section 307 requires “intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that there should be a bodily injury capable of causing death or even an injury in the nature of simple hurt.” Similarly, in Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2009) 11 SCC 273, the ingredients were identified as the overt act, the requisite intention or knowledge, and the absence of excuse for incurring the risk. The Court also cited State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru (2005) 5 SCC 554, State of M.P. v. Kanha alias Omprakash (2019) 3 SCC 605, and Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 366 to underscore that the absence of a fatal injury does not automatically exclude Section 307.

Why the Charge Couldn’t Be Added at This Stage

Despite correcting the legal premise, the Supreme Court upheld the refusal to add the charge on factual grounds. The trial had substantially progressed, and both medical certificates were available when the charge-sheet was filed. Yet, at no point during the initial stages—cognizance, framing of charges, or leading of evidence—did the petitioner or the injured victims allege that the accused acted with the intention or knowledge required for Section 307.

“No such case of an intention or knowledge as would attract Section 307 having been raised at the initial stage or at the stage of cognizance or when the evidence was being led; which the investigation also did not detect, the application made at the later stage, cannot be entertained,” the Court held.

The Court also noted the Sessions Court’s finding that there was no allegation of an intention to kill. The mere seriousness of the injury could not, by itself, supply the missing mental element.

Key Observations

  • “We are of the opinion that the grievousness of the injuries or the possibility of injury which could have led to death, is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307.”
  • “Hurt, grievous or simple, is not a precondition to attract Section 307, but, if there is a hurt, be it simple or grievous, and the act causing such hurt is with the intention or knowledge that such act could have caused death… then a graver punishment is provided.”
  • “To justify the conviction under Section 307, it would be sufficient if there is intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.”

Final Verdict

The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. However, it clarified an important procedural point: “It is the Court’s prerogative to alter the charge at any time when the trial is continuing, provided there is sound and justifiable cause, as emanating from the evidence led before court.”

The judgment reinforces that attempt to murder is an offence of intention, not outcome. While grievous injury may be evidence of intent, it is not a substitute for proving the requisite mental element. The decision serves as a reminder that belated attempts to introduce serious charges, without a prior factual foundation, will not succeed.

Case Title: Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors. | SLP (Crl.) No. 14611 of 2026 | 2026 INSC 1006