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Gujarat High Court Grants Bail in Freedom of Religion Act Dispute

In a significant order, the High Court of Gujarat has granted regular bail to Stevan Bhanubhai Macwan and an associate, emphasizing the importance of strict procedural compliance in prosecution under the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003. The decision, delivered by Justice Nikhil S. Kariel, highlights potential discrepancies in the statutory sanction process mandated for such offences.

The Backdrop: Accusations of Inducement

The case, registered at the Nadiad West Police Station in Kheda district, revolves around allegations under Sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003. The complainant alleged that the applicants attempted to induce religious conversion. However, the court observed that there had been no actual instance of religious conversion reported in the matter. The applicants, who had been in custody since October 2025, filed for regular bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Arguments on Both Sides

The applicants argued that their continued detention served no legal purpose, particularly because the investigation had concluded and a charge-sheet had already been filed. They expressed their willingness to adhere to any conditions imposed by the court to secure their release.

Conversely, the State of Gujarat, represented by the Public Prosecutor, vehemently opposed the bail plea. The State argued that the gravity of the allegations, as presented in the charge-sheet, warranted continued custody, urging the court not to exercise its discretion in favor of the accused.

Legal Analysis and Procedural Scrutiny

Justice Kariel’s analysis focused on the preliminary nature of the evidence and, specifically, the mandate of Section 6 of the Act. The court noted:

> "The fact that prima facie, the mandate of Section 6 does not appear to have been followed since the sanction of the District Magistrate for institution of the offence or prosecution, had been obtained only on 24.11.2025 as against the charge-sheet has been sent by the Investigating Officer to the learned Trial Court on 21.11.2025."

The court highlighted a vital distinction between the Act’s terminology, noting that the provision requires prior sanction for the institution of prosecution , and expressed concern over whether the Investigating Officer followed this requirement strictly. Relying on the principles in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation , the court favored liberty, noting that the accused had remained in custody for several months and the investigation reached a stage where bail was appropriate.

Key Observations

Highlighting the specific factors that led to the decision, the court observed: * On the severity of the charge: "The allegation in the FIR being serious in as much as the accused are stated to have induced the complainant into joining a different religion than the one he professes." * On the absence of actual conversion: "The fact of there being no actual conversion having taken place and the allegation restricted to some inducement being handed out to the complainant." * On the procedural mandate: "Prima facie, it would appear to this Court, that Section 6 would be imposing a mandate against the Investigating Officer that he would not institute prosecution for an offence without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate."

The Final Decision

The High Court ordered the release of the applicants upon executing a bond of Rs. 25,000, subject to several conditions, including the surrender of passports and a requirement to mark presence before the police station once a month. Crucially, the court clarified that its observations are of a preliminary nature, particularly given that the constitutional validity of the Act is currently pending consideration before the Supreme Court of India. The trial court has been directed to proceed independently, uninfluenced by these preliminary observations.

This ruling serves as a reminder to investigating agencies that the procedural nuances—even in sensitive social legislations—must be strictly adhered to to ensure a fair legal process.