Clarifies 'Chest' Means 'Breast' in Cases
In a significant ruling that bridges the gap between anatomical precision and the lived reality of child victims, the has held that when a child uses the word "chest" to describe sexually motivated touching, it must be understood as referring to the "breast" for the purposes of constituting under the .
Justice A. Badharudeen, sitting in , delivered the judgment on , while partly allowing a filed by a 58-year-old man who had been convicted by the . The ruling modified the from to simple , substantially reducing the sentence.
A Child's Escape and a Father's Alarm
The case traces back to an evening in in Malappuram district's Kondotty region. A 12-year-old boy had stepped out to a local shop at Arimbra Junction to purchase a mosquito repellent. Finding the shopkeeper absent, he waited at the spot. According to the , the accused—identified as Aboobacker, a 58-year-old man—approached the child from behind, pressed against his chest and caught hold of his abdomen.
The child's testimony, recorded as during trial, described how the accused then grabbed his hand, offered him Rs. 50, and attempted to lure him to a vacant house nearby. The boy managed to break free, ran home, and disclosed the incident to his parents. His father immediately contacted authorities, and the registered an the following day under Sections 7, 8, 9(l), 10, and 11(iv) read with .
The Special Court's Verdict and the Appeal
The conducted a full trial, examining ten witnesses and admitting eleven documentary exhibits. In its judgment dated , the trial court acquitted the accused of certain charges but convicted him under Section 9(l) read with Section 10——and sentenced him to seven years of with a fine of Rs. 50,000.
Aggrieved by the , the accused approached the High Court through . The appeal raised a pointed legal question: Could touching a child's "chest" satisfy the definition of under , which specifically criminalizes touching the "breast" with ?
The Anatomical Argument and the Court's Rebuttal
The 's counsel mounted a defence rooted in medical terminology. He contended that "chest" and "breast" are anatomically distinct organs—the chest being the upper front part of the torso containing the heart and lungs, while the breast refers specifically to the soft protruding organs on the front of the body. Since the victim's testimony used the word "chest" rather than "breast," the argument went, the of Section 7 was not met.
Justice Badharudeen examined dictionary definitions from both the Oxford and Webster's dictionaries, acknowledging that a
"distinct medical and anatomical difference"
exists between the two terms. However, the Court drew a crucial distinction between clinical language and the ordinary speech of a child recounting trauma.
The judgment observed that in the context of sexual molestation cases, "chest" is commonly employed as a synonym for "breast," and a child victim's use of the term must be interpreted in its ordinary and contextual sense rather than through a strictly medical lens.
Key Observations from the Bench
Justice Badharudeen's reasoning crystallized in several pointed observations that are likely to guide future POCSO prosecutions:
"When considering the of as defined under , spoken by a victim stating that the accused grabbed on his chest with , the only inference to be drawn is that the accused grabbed on the breast, which, in fact, covers a larger area of the chest in between the neck and the abdomen."
The Court further stated:
"Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the merely relying on the medical and anatomical difference between 'chest' and 'breast' has no significance and is set at rest."
Aggravated Assault Charge Falls
While the High Court firmly rejected the anatomical distinction argument, it found merit in the
's second contention.
requires proof that
was committed
"more than once or repeatedly."
The
had failed to adduce evidence demonstrating repeated acts.
Although the victim had alluded to a prior incident occurring two months earlier, he provided no specific details in his testimony, nor did he mention it in his statement recorded before a magistrate. The Court held that without concrete evidence of repetition, the charge of could not be sustained.
Modified Sentence and Implications
The High Court set aside the under Section 9(l) read with Section 10 and instead convicted the accused under Section 7 read with . The sentence was correspondingly reduced from seven years of to three years, and the fine was brought down from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 5,000, with a of two weeks' in case of non-payment.
The ruling carries important ramifications for how child victim testimony is evaluated in sexual offence trials. By declining to let a child's word choice become a technical escape route for accused persons, the has reinforced a that prioritises substance over semantics. Legal practitioners and trial courts across the state will now have clear guidance that a child's description of being touched on the "chest" can—and ordinarily should—be understood as referring to the breast, thereby satisfying the under .
The accused, who has been lodged at the , will be entitled to the period already undergone in custody against the modified sentence.