Gujarat High Court Quashes Wildlife Case Against Journalist For Absence Of Mandatory Statutory Complaint - 2025-08-05

Gujarat High Court Quashes Wildlife Case Against Journalist For Absence Of Mandatory Statutory Complaint

In a significant judgment regarding the procedural requirements of environmental law, the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad has quashed criminal proceedings initiated against a journalist. The ruling clarifies the strict limitations on how forest-related offenses must be prosecuted under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

A Night in the Sanctuary

The case originated from an incident on November 4-5, 2009, when petitioner Manish Bhupendrabhai Panwala, a correspondent for NDTV, visited the Gir National Park and Sanctuary. While the petitioner was initially visiting with valid permits, he and his companions were later intercepted by the local Range Forest Officer while observing a lion feeding in an area outside the sanctuary limits.

The authorities registered a Forest Offence First Report under Sections 2(16)(b), 2(33), 9, 39, and 51 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, alleging that the group had disturbed a lion in its natural act of hunting.

Legal Contentions

The petitioner argued that the allegations, even if accepted at face value, failed to satisfy the statutory definition of "hunting" under the Act. More importantly, the petitioner highlighted a "fundamental legal infirmity" regarding the process of initiation. Relying on Section 55 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, the defense argued that a court cannot take cognizance of these offenses based on a police-filed charge-sheet; rather, it requires a formal complaint by an authorized officer or the competent authority.

The State did not dispute this legal position, acknowledging that the proceedings had been initiated without the requisite statutory complaint.

The Court’s Reasoning

Justice J. C. Doshi observed that the legislative intent behind Section 55 is to ensure that only authorized experts initiate prosecution for wildlife offenses. The court emphasized that the term "complaint" excludes a police report. By failing to follow this mandatory procedure, the prosecution had encroached upon a jurisdictional boundary set by the statute.

While the court acknowledged the petitioner’s "disquieting insensitivity" toward wildlife conservation—noting his conduct was "reckless"—it maintained that such ethical lapses do not supersede the necessity of following due process. As a gesture of remorse, the petitioner had voluntarily donated ₹1,00,000 to the Gujarat State Lion Conservation Society, an action the court viewed as evidence of a "corrective and reformative attitude."

Key Observations

• "Merely disturbing a lion, does not meet the threshold to constitute an offence of ‘hunting’ under the Act."
• "The initiation of proceedings by way of a police report—rather than a statutory complaint filed by the designated officer—renders the cognizance to be taken by the learned trial Court legally unsustainable."
• "In the face of an express statutory bar contained in Section 55 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, the taking of cognizance on the basis of a police report is legally impermissible."

Implications of the Ruling

The High Court allowed the petition, quashing the Forest Offence First Report and all consequential proceedings. The judgment serves as a stern reminder to forest authorities that procedural compliance is a cornerstone of the criminal justice system, even in matters of environmental protection. While this specific prosecution was set aside, the court clarified that this order does not preclude authorized officers from instituting fresh, legally compliant proceedings based on the evidence collected, ensuring that the law remains both robust and procedurally sound.