A Matter of Discretion: Delhi High Court Curbs "Hypersensitive" Transfer Pleas in Landmark CBI Trial

In a stern reminder that judicial proceedings are governed by the trial court 's workflow rather than a litigant's preference, the High Court of Delhi has dismissed a petition seeking the transfer of a long-standing CBI case. The ruling, delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain, underscores that a presiding officer’s decision to consolidate final arguments does not constitute a valid ground for alleging bias.

Procedural Friction in a Decades-Old Case

At the center of the dispute is a trial originating from 1994 (RC No. 2(S)/1994-SIU.V/SIC), currently being heard as Sessions Case No. 02/2019. The petitioners, Balbir Chand Tiwari and Sukhmohinder Singh Sandhu, expressed profound unease when, in January 2026, the presiding officer shifted the methodology for final arguments from a piecemeal, "phased" approach—initially ordered by a predecessor—to a comprehensive review covering both the point of sanction and the merits of the case.

Fearing that this procedural pivot signaled a lack of impartiality, the petitioners moved to have the case transferred to a different court. Their request, having been previously denied by the Principal District and Sessions Judge at the Rouse Avenue District Courts , was subsequently brought before the High Court.

The Arguments: Fear vs. Prerogative

Counsel for the petitioners argued that the departure from a "structured and phased" argument schedule created significant uncertainty, leading them to believe that the sudden switch indicated a predetermined stance. Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in Kanaklata vs. State (NCT of Delhi) , they contended that judicial observations or shifts in procedure can trigger reasonable apprehensions in a litigant's mind, necessitating a move to ensure the perception of justice.

Conversely, the court found these apprehensions to be "unfounded, specious and misplaced." The court emphasized that a judge’s preference for hearing a case in an integrated manner is a matter of administrative and intellectual discretion, not a red flag for legal prejudice.

Key Observations

The High Court’s judgment provides a sharp critique of the tendency to seek transfers over minor procedural fluctuations:

• On Judicial Discretion: "Such inconsequential aspects about the manner in which the learned Trial Court desires to hear final arguments, are better left to its wisdom and discretion."
• On the Nature of Bias: "Mere fact that, the court, now, wants to hear final arguments in a comprehensive manner would not, by itself, mean anything significant or suggestive of any bias or predetermination of the outcome."
• On the Threshold for Transfer: "Order of transfer of case is bound to have ‘depressing, demoralizing and disconsolate impact’ on the concerned judge and, therefore, an order of transfer cannot be passed as a matter of routine."
• On the Petitioners' Stance: "The petitioners herein seem hypersensitive, who seem to have misread the ‘order and mind of the court’ and jumped to imaginary and unwarranted conclusion."

A Verdict Against "Routine" Transfers

Distinguishing the present case from Kanaklata , where the Supreme Court intervened due to highly specific, prejudiced remarks regarding sensitive legislation, the High Court held that the petitioners here failed to establish any objective evidence of unfairness.

The court’s decision serves as a significant precedent for judicial administration at the trial level. By dismissing the petition, the High Court has affirmed that the internal management of a trial court ’s docket is not a legitimate battleground for litigants to shop for a preferred judge. The finality of the proceedings—as the case is already at the stage of final arguments—weighed heavily on the court's refusal to disrupt the judicial process for what it deemed a "hypersensitive" grievance.