Change of Recruitment Criteria After Commencement Does Not Invalidate Process if Non-Discriminatory: Punjab and Haryana High Court - 2025-03-07

When the Rules of the Game Shift: Fairness in Public Recruitment

In a significant ruling addressing the boundaries of administrative discretion in public appointments, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh has clarified the limits of altering selection criteria mid-process. Justice Jagmohan Bansal, presiding over the case of Shruti Jain vs. State of Haryana and others , held that while the disclosure of assessment criteria is ideal for transparency, the failure to do so does not automatically constitute discrimination if all candidates remain similarly unaware and none are granted preferential benefits.

The Unfolding Dispute

The petitioner, Shruti Jain, a Chartered Accountant, applied for the post of Accounts Officer in the Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited (UHBVNL) following an advertisement in 2016. The selection process—comprising academic qualifications, experience, and an interview—did not outline a bifurcation of marks at the outset. Mid-way through, in January 2018, the Commission introduced a criteria list allocating 10 marks for research publications.

Following her interview in March 2018, Jain challenged the selection process, arguing that the sudden introduction of mark-weighting for publications amounted to an illegal "change in the rules of the game."

Arguments at the Bar

Representing the petitioner, Senior Advocate Shailendra Jain relied heavily on established precedents, including the landmark K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh and the recent Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court , which prohibit changing eligibility criteria after a selection process has commenced. The petitioner argued that had she been aware of the 10-mark weightage, she would have proactively presented her publications.

Conversely, counsel for the Haryana Public Service Commission countered that the criteria were applied uniformly. Because the requirement to disclose publications was included in the proforma provided during the interview, and no candidate opted to disclose such publications, the marks were ultimately not awarded to anyone. Effectively, they argued, the "hidden" criteria led to no competitive advantage for any party.

The Court’s Analysis: Fairness Without Prejudice

Justice Bansal’s deliberation turned on whether the late disclosure constituted actionable discrimination. While acknowledging that public authorities must strive for consistency and transparency to satisfy the requirements of Article 14, the Court noted a distinct lack of prejudice to the petitioner.

"It is not the case of the petitioner that selected candidates were either aware of criteria or were granted marks of publication," the Court observed. Because no candidate—including the successful ones—received marks for publications, the "uneven playing field" argument failed to trigger a violation of the Constitution.

Key Observations

The judgment highlighted several critical points regarding the nature of recruitment:

• On the "Rules of the Game": "The respondent-Commission no doubt in the interest of transparency and fairness could disclose criteria of assessment, however, it was not mandatory because in every interview, the interview board is not required to disclose criteria of assessment."
• On Equality of Treatment: "No discrimination was made between similarly situated persons. It is not case of the petitioner that selected candidates were either aware of criteria or were granted marks of publication."
• Final Legal Finding: "In such circumstances, it is difficult to hold that respondent-Commission after commencement of selection process has changed rules of game which caused prejudice to the petitioner."

Final Decision

Concluding that the lack of disclosure did not result in a disparate impact or unfair advantage, the Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms that while procedural precision is required in administrative law, a petitioner seeking to overturn a recruitment result must demonstrate actual prejudice or active discrimination, rather than a mere procedural anomaly. As the Court noted, since the criteria remained a 'dead letter' for all candidates due to the lack of claims, the integrity of the selection process held firm.