Home Care Retail Marts Case: Supreme Court Says Losing Party Can Seek Section 9 Relief

In a significant clarification of post-award interim remedies under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Supreme Court of India has held that a party that loses an arbitration is not barred from invoking Section 9 of the Act. The Court, in Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi (2026 INSC 415), rejected the restrictive interpretation that only a successful award-holder could approach a court for interim measures after the award is rendered. However, the Court equally emphasised that the mere ability to apply does not translate into an entitlement to relief; the unsuccessful party faces a heightened threshold of “care, caution and circumspection” before a court may exercise its discretion in its favour.

The judgment dismantles a line of High Court precedent that had effectively read a “winner-only” condition into Section 9. For over a decade, courts such as the Bombay High Court in Dirk India Private Limited (2013) and the Delhi High Court in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games (2014) had held that post-award Section 9 is a mechanism to preserve the “fruits” of an arbitral award for the successful party. The underlying logic was intuitive: if Party A wins and Party B threatens to dissipate assets, Party A needs protection; if Party A loses, what exactly is there to preserve? That reasoning, the Supreme Court now holds, conflates the question of statutory access with the question of discretionary grant.

The Statutory Starting Point

Section 9 of the Arbitration Act permits “a party” to seek interim measures from a court before, during, or after the arbitral proceedings, but before enforcement under Section 36. The definition of “party” in Section 2(1)(h) is deliberately outcome-neutral: it refers simply to a party to an arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court observed that neither provision creates a distinction between a successful and an unsuccessful party. To introduce such a distinction at the post-award stage, the Court held, would amount to rewriting the statute.

The Court underscored that the expression “a party” cannot be read as “an award-holder” or “a successful party”. The language of the Act is clear, and the legislature chose not to qualify the term. Therefore, the threshold question of maintainability must be answered in favour of any party that meets the definition—regardless of the arbitral outcome.

Access Is Not Grant

The real contribution of Home Care lies in its careful delineation between maintainability and relief. The judgment acknowledges the legitimate concerns that drove the earlier restrictive approach: finality of awards, risk of abuse, and potential for delay tactics. An unsuccessful party could, in theory, file a Section 34 challenge and simultaneously move under Section 9 to disrupt enforcement. But the Court holds that these concerns are best addressed at the stage of discretion, not at the stage of jurisdiction.

“Access to the statutory remedy is not equivalent to entitlement to the relief sought therein,” the Court observed. Traditional equitable principlesprima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury—remain applicable, but the post-award context fundamentally alters their application. For a losing party, the adverse arbitral award is a powerful indicator that the party does not have a strong case on the merits. The court must therefore scrutinise the application with “care, caution and circumspection”. The losing party cannot approach the court as though the arbitration never happened; the tribunal’s determination must inform the judicial assessment.

A Functional, Not Binary, Approach

The Supreme Court’s reasoning shifts the inquiry away from a rigid winner-loser binary and toward a more functional question: what interest, subject matter, or amount requires protection at this stage of the arbitral lifecycle? The statute does not change, but the objective of protection changes. Before arbitration, interim measures preserve the subject matter. During arbitration, they fill gaps where the tribunal cannot act. After the award, the primary objective is to protect the successful party’s ability to enforce. Yet, in exceptional circumstances, an unsuccessful party may also need protection—for instance, to prevent irreparable harm while its Section 34 challenge is pending, or to secure assets that might otherwise be dissipated in a way that frustrates any eventual relief.

The judgment does not elaborate on what those exceptional circumstances might be, leaving that to the trial courts. But it makes clear that the default position is not in favour of the losing party. The award itself creates a strong presumption against granting interim relief to the party that lost. Only where the losing party can demonstrate a compelling need for protection—one that outweighs the finality of the award and the risk of abuse—should the court exercise its discretion.

Implications for Practice

For arbitration practitioners, Home Care provides a clear roadmap. First, do not assume that a losing client has no remedy under Section 9. The application will be maintainable. Second, prepare for a significantly heavier burden. The court will not treat the application as routine. The losing party must articulate a specific, non-speculative harm that cannot be remedied by damages or by the eventual outcome of the Section 34 proceedings. Third, the judgment reinforces the importance of the Section 34 challenge itself: the strength of that challenge will be a critical factor in the Section 9 analysis. A patently weak challenge will almost certainly preclude any interim relief.

On the other side, successful award-holders can take comfort that the judgment does not dilute their position. The award-holder remains entitled to seek Section 9 relief on the standard footing—to preserve the fruits of the award. The Court’s emphasis on heightened scrutiny applies only to the losing party. Award-holders do not need to meet that higher bar.

Conclusion

Home Care Retail Marts v. Haresh N. Sanghavi is a carefully calibrated decision. It respects the legislative choice to keep Section 9 open to “a party” without artificial restrictions, while simultaneously guarding against abuse by insisting on rigorous judicial discretion. The judgment does not undermine the finality of arbitral awards; it simply recognises that finality and interim protection are not always in conflict. In the post-award stage, the court must balance finality with fairness, enforcement with protection, and statutory access with judicial restraint. That balance, as the Supreme Court has now made clear, cannot be achieved by a simplistic winner-loser classification. The real question is whether the circumstances justify the exceptional exercise of the court’s power—and that question must be answered on the facts of each case, not on the outcome of the arbitration alone.