India Cannot Abandon Arbitration, Darius Khambata Says of 2024 Finance Ministry Memo

In a sharp critique that has resonated across the legal community, senior advocate Darius Khambata has characterised the Finance Ministry’s 2024 memorandum on arbitration as a “plaintive cry of a disgruntled litigant.” Speaking at a recent forum, Khambata rejected any suggestion that India should retreat from commercial arbitration, arguing that the country’s overburdened courts simply cannot absorb the volume of conventional commercial suits. His remarks come amid growing debate over whether the government is seeking to rein in arbitration in favour of domestic litigation.

Khambata, a former Advocate General of Maharashtra and one of India’s most respected arbitration practitioners, was responding to a question on whether governments are increasingly moving away from arbitration and turning back to domestic courts. He did not mince words. “If you’re talking about India, I don’t think India can ever afford to move away from commercial arbitration,” he stated emphatically.

The Finance Ministry’s 2024 memo, which has not been officially released but has been widely discussed in legal circles, is understood to advocate for greater reliance on Indian courts for dispute resolution, particularly in cases involving government contracts. Khambata’s intervention adds a powerful voice to the opposition, framing the memo as a reactive document driven by frustration rather than sound policy.

The State of India’s Courts

Khambata’s central argument rests on the well-documented crisis of judicial backlog. Indian courts, from the Supreme Court down to district levels, are inundated with constitutional, service, and social litigation. “Indian courts did not have the time or space to devote similar attention to conventional commercial suits,” he observed. This reality, he suggested, makes it impractical—if not impossible—for the judiciary to handle the intricate, time-sensitive disputes that commercial arbitration currently resolves.

Over the past two decades, commercial arbitration has become the preferred mechanism for resolving business conflicts in India. Major infrastructure projects, cross-border contracts, and corporate transactions routinely include arbitration clauses. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as amended in 2015 and 2019, was designed to make India an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction, aligning with international best practices. However, the Finance Ministry’s memo signals a potential policy shift that could undermine these gains.

The Memo and Its Implications

Although the exact contents of the memo remain confidential, informed sources suggest it expresses dissatisfaction with the cost and duration of arbitration proceedings, particularly those involving government entities. Some policymakers argue that domestic courts offer greater transparency, lower costs, and more predictable outcomes. Khambata dismissed this reasoning as shortsighted.

“Calling the memo a ‘plaintive cry of a disgruntled litigant’ is a pointed way of saying that the government, after losing several high-profile arbitration cases, is now trying to change the rules,” explained a senior corporate lawyer who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Arbitration is a consensual process, and the government has been a willing participant. To now suggest that courts are a better forum ignores the very reasons arbitration was embraced in the first place.”

Khambata’s critique highlights a fundamental tension: while the government is both a major party to arbitration and a regulator of the process, its dual role can lead to conflicts of interest. If the government pushes cases back to courts, it risks further clogging the system and deterring foreign investment, which values the neutrality and enforceability of arbitral awards.

Legal Analysis: Arbitration vs. Domestic Litigation

From a legal perspective, the debate touches on core principles of party autonomy, finality of awards, and judicial efficiency. Arbitration offers parties the ability to choose their arbitrators, control procedural timelines, and resolve disputes in a confidential setting. Domestic courts, by contrast, are bound by rigid procedural codes, face chronic delays, and lack specialist expertise in complex commercial matters.

The Indian judiciary itself has recognised these advantages. In numerous decisions, the Supreme Court has upheld the pro-arbitration stance of the Act, emphasising minimal judicial interference. For instance, in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012), the court held that the seat of arbitration determines the law governing the proceedings, reinforcing party autonomy. Similarly, in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021), the court clarified the scope of judicial review, limiting it to grounds of fraud, illegality, or public policy.

A retreat from arbitration would contradict this established jurisprudence. It would also send a troubling signal to international investors, who often insist on arbitration as a condition for investing in India. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings, which India has sought to improve, explicitly consider the quality of dispute resolution mechanisms.

Impact on Legal Practice

For legal practitioners, the Finance Ministry memo—and Khambata’s response—raise several practical concerns. Arbitration specialists may see a decline in institutional arbitration work if the government adopts a policy of litigating disputes in courts. Law firms that have built robust arbitration practices could face uncertainty, while litigation firms might see a temporary uptick in high-value commercial suits.

However, Khambata’s intervention also serves as a rallying cry for the arbitration bar. “We must remind the government that arbitration is not a luxury but a necessity,” said a partner at a leading law firm. “The judiciary has consistently supported it, and any policy reversal would be a step backward.”

The debate also highlights the need for capacity building within the judiciary. Experts argue that instead of abandoning arbitration, the government should focus on strengthening institutional arbitration bodies in India, such as the Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration and the Delhi International Arbitration Centre. Better-trained arbitrators, streamlined procedures, and effective enforcement mechanisms would address many of the concerns raised in the memo.

Conclusion

The clash between the Finance Ministry’s apparent preference for domestic courts and the overwhelming consensus that arbitration is indispensable for India’s commercial ecosystem is far from resolved. Darius Khambata’s characterisation of the memo as a “plaintive cry of a disgruntled litigant” has crystallised the stakes. The legal profession must now engage in a robust dialogue to ensure that policy decisions are guided by evidence and long-term interests rather than short-term grievances.

As India continues its quest to become a global economic powerhouse, the efficiency and reliability of its dispute resolution mechanisms will be critical. Abandoning arbitration would be a costly mistake. The message from Khambata and the broader legal community is clear: India cannot afford to look back.