Interim Stay Cannot Be Granted in Time-Barred Appeal Without Delay Condonation: Rajasthan High Court

In a significant ruling that reinforces procedural discipline in appellate proceedings, the Rajasthan High Court has held that an interim stay order cannot be passed in a time-barred appeal without first condoning the delay. The bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand quashed an interim stay granted by the Revenue Appellate Authority (RAA) in an appeal that was filed after a delay of over three years, observing that without condonation of delay, the appeal is not validly instituted and the authority lacks jurisdiction to pass any interim orders.


Background: A Suit, Restoration, and a Three-Year Delay

The case originated from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by Manni Devi (the petitioner) against Bhuli Devi and Panchu (the respondents) before the Sub Divisional Magistrate (SDM), Chaksu, in 2018. The SDM passed an interim order on 14 May 2018 directing parties to maintain status quo. However, due to the petitioner's non-appearance, the suit was dismissed in default on 25 March 2019.

Thereafter, Manni Devi filed a restoration application, which was allowed on 25 January 2022, and the suit was restored to its original number. Aggrieved by this restoration order, the respondents filed an appeal before the RAA after a delay of more than three years, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. While issuing notice on the appeal and the condonation application, the RAA passed an interim order on 10 June 2026 staying the effect and operation of the 25 January 2022 restoration order—without first deciding the delay condonation application.

Manni Devi challenged this interim order before the Board of Revenue, which rejected her revision petition on 4 August 2026, prompting her to approach the High Court.


The Legal Conundrum: Jurisdiction vs. Interim Relief

The core issue before the High Court was: Can an appellate authority pass an interim stay order in a time-barred appeal without first condoning the delay?

Petitioner's Arguments:
Mr. Prahlad Sharma, counsel for Manni Devi, contended that the RAA acted illegally by granting interim relief without deciding the condonation application. He argued that a time-barred appeal is not validly instituted until delay is condoned, and therefore, the authority lacks jurisdiction to pass any orders. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Gagandeep Pratishthan Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Mechano (AIR 2002 SC 204), where it was held that an interim order should not be passed unless the delay is condoned.

Respondent's Arguments:
Senior counsel Mr. R.K. Agarwal, representing the respondents, argued that the delay occurred because they were unaware of the 25 January 2022 order. He submitted that an interim order can be passed without condoning delay in appropriate circumstances, citing the Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Dilip Bhai Gajrota v. Contractor Lime Gotan (AIR 1996 Raj. 119). He further contended that the revision petition before the Board was not maintainable and that the petitioner could raise objections before the RAA.


Court's Verdict: No Jurisdiction Without Condonation

The High Court rejected the respondents' contentions and held that the question of limitation goes to the very root of the court's jurisdiction.

"Unless the delay in filing the appeal is condoned, the appeal cannot be said to have come into existence in the eyes of law. In the absence of a validly instituted appeal, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and decide a time barred appeal on merits."

The court distinguished the Dilip Bhai Gajrota precedent, noting that an interim stay in a time-barred appeal can only be granted in "extreme circumstances" where the order under challenge has serious consequences. In the present case, no such exceptional circumstances were present, and the RAA had not even recorded any reasons to justify passing the interim order without first condoning the delay.

The court also referred to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (2024 SCC OnLine SC 489), which emphasized that the rules of limitation are based on sound public policy and that courts must first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered for delay before considering the merits.


The Final Decision

The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed both the RAA's interim order dated 10 June 2026 and the Board of Revenue's order dated 4 August 2026. The matter has been remanded back to the RAA with a direction to first hear arguments on the condonation application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and decide it in accordance with law. The parties have been directed to appear before the RAA on 22 September 2026.

The court clarified that the RAA must decide the condonation application on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observations made in this judgment, and shall endeavour to dispose of it expeditiously without granting unnecessary adjournments.


Implications: A Reminder of Procedural Fundamentals

This ruling serves as a crucial reminder for litigants and appellate authorities alike that procedural compliance—especially regarding limitation—is not a mere technicality but a jurisdictional prerequisite. By holding that an interim order cannot be passed in a time-barred appeal without first condoning the delay, the Rajasthan High Court has reinforced the principle that the institution of a valid appeal is a condition precedent for the exercise of any appellate power. The decision is likely to impact pending revenue appeals across the state and may prompt appellate authorities to prioritize the determination of limitation issues before delving into merits or granting interim relief.