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How Limitation Period Is Calculated for Applications Under Section 24 of the RDB Act 1993

When the Limitation Clock Starts Running for Applications Before the Debt Recovery Tribunal Under Section 24

A recurring question before borrowers, banks, and financial institutions is: when is the period of limitation calculated for filing an application under Section 24 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993? The answer determines whether a recovery application, an objection, or an appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) is maintainable or hopelessly time-barred. This post breaks down how the limitation period is computed, which statutory provisions govern it, and where the Supreme Court has drawn the line on condonation of delay.

Section 24 of the RDB Act Brings in the Limitation Act, 1963

Section 24 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (formerly the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993) expressly provides that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal. This means the time within which an application must be filed before the DRT is, in principle, governed by the general framework of the Limitation Act 2015 5 Supreme 642.

Because the RDB Act is itself a special law, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 becomes relevant. That provision states that where a special or local law prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit, appeal, or application, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act — including Section 5 on condonation of delay — apply only insofar as they are not expressly excluded by the special law 2023 1 Supreme 106.

How the Period Is Actually Calculated

  • Original applications under Section 19 of the RDB Act: These are treated as applications to which the Limitation Act applies through Section 24. The general residuary rule, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes three years from the date the right to apply accrues2024 0 Supreme(Guj) 1196.
  • For special periods prescribed under other statutes, the calculation typically begins from the date of the triggering event — such as the date of the impugned order, the date of a sale notice, or the date of a demand notice.
  • Extensions and exclusions: Principles such as acknowledgment of debt under Section 18 of the Limitation Act and part-payment under Section 19 can extend the prescribed period where the facts support them 2026 Supreme(Online)(NCLT) 3563.

Where Condonation of Delay Is Excluded — the Key Distinction

The Supreme Court's decision in International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd. v. Official Liquidator, (2017) 16 SCC 137, is the controlling precedent. The Court held:

The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the Legislature has provided for application of the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The appellate tribunal has been conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days under Section 20(3) of the Act.

In other words:

  • Section 19 applications (original proceedings): Section 24 applies the Limitation Act, including Sections 4 to 24, in full

    Surinder Mahajan VS Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal

    .
  • Appeals under Section 30 of the RDB Act (against a Recovery Officer's order): Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. Section 24 is limited to proceedings before the Tribunal originating under Section 19, and the appellate route has its own built-in condonation power under Section 20(3), which excludes the general Limitation Act 2017 7 Supreme 606 and 2023 1 Supreme 106.
  • Review applications under Rule 5A of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993: These must be filed within 30 days, and beyond that there is no power to condone delay 2015 5 Supreme 642.

SARFAESI Applications Under Section 17 — A Split in Judicial Opinion

For applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, which prescribe 45 days for filing, High Courts took differing views on whether the DRT can condone delay. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Surinder Mahajan's case reasoned that since Section 17(7) requires Section 17 applications to be disposed of under the RDB Act, and Section 24 of the RDB Act imports the Limitation Act, Section 5 condonation would apply 2015 5 Supreme 642.

The contrary view — reflected in Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal and Standard Chartered Bank — is that where a special Act contains no condonation provision, Section 5 has no role. However, decisions of the Andhra Pradesh and Bombay High Courts, later endorsed by the Supreme Court in the SARFAESI context, hold that in the absence of any provision excluding the Limitation Act, applications for condonation of delay are maintainable before the DRT under Section 17 and the DRAT under Section 18, with sufficiency of cause being a question of fact in each case

Surinder Mahajan VS Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal

2013 0 Supreme(P&H) 346 and 2024 0 Supreme(Gau) 1693.

A Parallel Insight From Insolvency Jurisprudence

The same Article 137 framework of three years from accrual of the right to apply governs applications under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 via Section 238A. Courts have consistently held that where default occurred more than three years before filing, the application is barred, subject to Section 5 condonation and extension events such as a decree, acknowledgment, or the Covid exclusion period 2026 Supreme(Online)(NCLAT) 492 and 2026 Supreme(Online)(NCLT) 382 and 2024 Supreme(Online)(NCLAT) 1183.

Key Takeaways

  • Section 24 of the RDB Act makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to Tribunal applications; for Section 19 applications, the residuary three-year period under Article 137 runs from the date the right to apply accrues.
  • The phrase as far as may be allows the special statute to exclude the Limitation Act — and the Supreme Court has found such express exclusion for Section 30 appeals and review applications.
  • For Section 17 SARFAESI applications, the prevailing view permits condonation of delay under the Limitation Act, since no exclusionary provision exists.
  • If delay has occurred, litigants should generally demonstrate sufficient cause under the specific applicable provision rather than assume Section 5 is automatically available.

This discussion is intended as general legal information and may not reflect the nuances of any particular case; the specific facts and the governing statute should always be examined carefully before filing.

#RDDBAct #DebtRecoveryTribunal #LimitationAct #SARFAESI #BankingLaw
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