Converts Conviction to for Shankar Ram
The , in a significant ruling, altered the conviction of Shankar Ram from to the lesser offence of , clarifying that a mere assault without any aimed at committing rape cannot amount to an . The Single Bench of Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava delivered the judgment on , in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 725 of .
Background: A Fodder-Grass Dispute Turns Into a Criminal Charge
The case traces back to , when a married woman was cutting fodder grass in her field near a rehat (water lifting device) in Palamau district. She alleged that Shankar Ram, who was sitting with her brother-in-law Santosh Uraon, began talking to her informally and then suddenly rushed at her, pushing her to the ground. She managed to escape but was caught again and thrown into a paddy field. The woman raised an alarm, causing the accused to flee, after which she returned home and narrated the incident to her family.
A village panchayat was convened the next day, where the woman identified Shankar Ram. Following this, a First Information Report was lodged at under (). The trial court convicted the appellant in and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹1,000. Aggrieved, Shankar Ram appealed to the High Court in , but the judgment was pronounced only in 2026.
Appeal: No Constituting
The appellant's counsel, , argued that the trial court had placed undue reliance on the prosecutrix's testimony, which contained material contradictions. He contended that even if the entire prosecution case were accepted, the essential ingredients of under were not made out. The act described—pushing the woman to the ground—amounted at best to an , not an attempt to have sexual intercourse.
The State, represented by , defended the conviction, submitting that the trial court had correctly appreciated the evidence and that the victim's consistent account of being overwhelmed twice by the accused justified the charge of .
Legal Analysis: Distinguishing Attempt from
Examining the evidence, the High Court found that the prosecutrix's story—both in the FIR and in her deposition—was essentially that the appellant had pushed her to the ground twice. There was no specific allegation that he had committed any towards the commission of rape, such as removing clothes, attempting penetration, or any clearly indicating an intention to rape.
The Court drew a clear distinction: for an offence to constitute , there must be some act that is to the actual commission of rape. Merely grabbing or throwing a woman to the ground, without more, falls short of that threshold. The Court observed:
“The evidence of the prosecutrix, when considered in its entirety, does not disclose any specific or on the part of the appellant which can be said to constitute an act towards the commission of rape so as to attract the punishable under Section 376/511 of the I.P.C. The conduct of the appellant simply shows that he has committed some act of assault with the prosecutrix, which may likely to outrage her modesty and nothing has been committed towards commission of the rape. Therefore, at best the offence falls under ”
The Court also noted that the immediate disclosures made by the woman to her family members described a (scuffle) and an attempt to outrage her modesty, rather than an . This consistent narrative reinforced the conclusion that the appellant's acts fell under — to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.
Key Observations from the Court
Justice Srivastava made several pivotal observations in the judgment:
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“The prosecutrix has stated that the appellant twice pushed/thrashed her to the ground and thereafter she managed to escape and raised alarm. However, there is no specific evidence regarding any attempt on the part of the appellant to commit sexual intercourse or any act to the commission of rape.”
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“The immediate disclosures made by the prosecutrix to her family members also indicate an act of assault/ and an attempt to outrage her modesty, rather than an attempt to commit rape.”
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“The consistent evidence of the prosecutrix regarding the appellant having caught hold of her and pushed her to the ground, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, establishes that the appellant had committed an assault upon the prosecutrix with the intention of outraging or with knowledge that his act was likely to outrage, her modesty. Thus, the ingredients of are made out against the appellant.”
Decision: Conviction Modified, Sentence Already Undergone
The High Court dismissed the appeal on merits but with a modification in conviction and sentence. It altered the conviction under Sections 376/511 IPC to the offence under . Considering that the appellant had already spent about two months in custody during the trial, and more than 22 years had elapsed since the incident, the Court sentenced him to the period already undergone. The appellant, who was on bail, was discharged from his bail bonds.
The ruling reinforces the principle that every sexual assault is not necessarily an , and courts must carefully examine the specific acts alleged to determine whether they meet the strict threshold of an attempt to commit the graver offence. Mere physical assault, without a clear and proximate act directed at committing rape, will be treated as under .