Karnataka High Court Asks 32-Year-Old Woman to Clarify Basis of Surrogacy Age Challenge

The Karnataka High Court on Tuesday directed a 32-year-old woman to clarify the legal foundation of her petition challenging the statutory minimum age of 35 years for single women seeking surrogacy under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021. Justice C.M. Poonacha, presiding over the matter, questioned whether her challenge was rooted in a medical necessity to undergo surrogacy before turning 35 or in a broader constitutional claim that the age requirement itself is arbitrary. The court adjourned the hearing to October 1 after granting the respondents time to file statements of objections.

Background: The Surrogacy Act and the Age Barrier

The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, was enacted to regulate altruistic surrogacy in India and prohibit commercial surrogacy. Section 2(1)(s) defines an “intending woman” as an Indian woman who is a widow or divorcee between the ages of 35 and 45 years and who intends to avail of surrogacy. This provision effectively bars single women—whether never married, widowed, or divorced—who are under 35 from accessing surrogacy services.

The petitioner, a 32-year-old woman, challenged this provision as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 (right to equality) and 21 (right to life and personal liberty) of the Constitution. Through her counsel, she argued that motherhood is a fundamental right and that the age restriction unreasonably discriminates against younger single women. She sought a direction to the authorities to issue Essentiality and Eligibility Certificates to enable her to undergo surrogacy by relaxing the age requirement—effectively seeking that the provision be read down to permit her at her current age.

The Hearing: Court Seeks a Coherent Legal Basis

During the hearing, Justice Poonacha pressed the petitioner’s counsel to articulate a clear legal rationale for reading down the statutory age limit. The court noted that the statute provides a window of 35 to 45 years for single widowed or divorced women and questioned why the petitioner should be accommodated at 32.

“Statute gives a window of 35-45 [for single widowed or divorced women]. You want it at 32... What's the reason for reading down [the provision]? Your argument appears to be why should I wait till 35… Or it is not that, medically, if you don't do it now, you won't be able to do it at 35? Is that true? Stick to an argument [out of the two],” the court observed.

The petitioner’s counsel conceded that, from a medical standpoint, the petitioner would be able to undergo surrogacy at the age of 35. In response, the court orally remarked: “…You have your answer then.” This exchange underscored the court’s view that without a demonstrable medical urgency, the challenge may lack a compelling basis for reading down the provision.

Union Government’s Intervention

Counsel for the Union Government submitted that since the petitioner had previously undergone tumour surgery, a medical report should be placed on record indicating up to what age it would be medically possible for her to undergo surrogacy. The government also suggested that an expert opinion could clarify whether the petitioner’s present health condition would prevent her from producing her own gametes in the future if she were to wait until she turns 35. The court allowed the government to file its statement of objections and directed the petitioner to consider providing the requested medical documentation.

Legal Analysis: Reading Down and Fundamental Rights

The case raises significant questions about the standard for reading down a statutory provision. Reading down is a judicial tool used to save a law from being declared unconstitutional by interpreting it narrowly or by relaxing its application in certain cases. The Supreme Court has held that reading down is permissible only when the provision is ambiguous or would otherwise lead to an absurdity or a violation of fundamental rights.

Here, the petitioner argues that the age requirement creates an irrational classification between single women under 35 and those aged 35-45, violating Article 14. She also contends that the right to reproductive autonomy, a facet of Article 21, includes the right to choose surrogacy. However, the court’s pointed query suggests that it may require a stronger nexus between the age restriction and a fundamental rights violation—especially if the petitioner can safely wait three years. The concession that she can medically undergo surrogacy at 35 weakens the argument that the law imposes an undue burden on her right to motherhood.

Moreover, the court’s insistence on a single, coherent argument indicates that it views the challenge as potentially resting on two different grounds: one based on medical necessity (which would be fact-specific) and another based on the constitutional invalidity of the age cap itself (which would require a broader attack on the legislative classification). The petitioner will need to choose and substantiate her primary legal footing.

Implications for Surrogacy Regulation and Reproductive Rights

This case is being closely watched by legal practitioners and reproductive rights advocates. If the court ultimately reads down the age requirement for the petitioner, it could open the door for other single women under 35 to seek similar relaxations. Alternatively, a decision upholding the age limit would reinforce the legislative policy that only older single women—presumed to have diminished fertility—should have access to surrogacy. The outcome may also influence ongoing debates about the constitutionality of age-based restrictions in assisted reproductive technology (ART) laws.

The Union Government’s request for a medical report underscores the government’s focus on the petitioner’s individual health circumstances rather than the broader validity of the provision. This approach may allow the court to decide the matter on narrow, fact-specific grounds without making a sweeping declaration on the constitutional validity of Section 2(1)(s).

Conclusion: Next Steps

The Karnataka High Court has listed the matter for further hearing on October 1, by which time the Union Government and the State Government are expected to file their statements of objections. The petitioner will also need to clarify her legal argument and may be required to submit additional medical evidence. The case, initially before Justice Suraj Govindaraj on June 29, has now been assigned to Justice Poonacha’s bench for continued adjudication. As the legal community awaits the next hearing, the central tension remains: can a single woman under 35 successfully challenge a statutory age limit when she admits she can wait? The answer will have lasting implications for surrogacy law and fundamental rights in India.