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Karnataka High Court Declares Notification Granting to SP Under Karnataka Police Act Illegal
In a significant ruling that reaffirms the primacy of statutory text over , the has declared a state notification purporting to confer on Superintendents of Police (SP) under the , as legally void. Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum, presiding over a single bench, quashed an externment order passed by the Belagavi SP against a daily wage worker, holding that the SP lacks the statutory authority to exercise powers under Sections 55 and 56 of the Act.
The Dispute: A Notification Without Legal Efficacy
The case arose from a notification issued on , by the , which among other things, sought to authorize Superintendents of Police to act under Sections 55 and 56 of the Karnataka Police Act. Section 55 allows for the removal of persons about to commit offences, while Section 56 deals with removal of persons convicted of certain offences. The notification was challenged by Chandrakant Shankar Vaddar, a resident of Akkol in Belagavi district, who had been served an externment order on , by the SP, Belagavi.
The petitioner, through his counsel , contended that the SP had no jurisdiction to pass the order, as the statutory scheme under the Act vests such powers only in the Commissioner of Police (in Bangalore and other notified commissionerates), the District Magistrate, or a specially empowered Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
State’s Stance: Relying on Delegated Powers
The State, represented by Additional Government Advocate , defended the notification, arguing that the government had the power to extend the application of Section 55 through a notification. It was urged that the impugned notification validly conferred these powers on the SP, and consequently, the externment order was justified.
Fatal Flaw: No Publication in the Official Gazette
The court first noted a glaring . The notification dated , had never been published in the Official Gazette—a mandatory requirement under Section 55 of the Act. Justice Magadum observed: “Consequently, in the absence of publication of the notification dated 18.11.2025 in the Official Gazette, the statutory requirement under , remains unfulfilled. The notification, therefore, cannot confer any jurisdiction upon the Superintendent of Police to exercise powers under Sections 55 and 56 of the Act, 1963. On this ground alone, the exercise of such power by the Superintendent of Police would be .”
Beyond Procedural Failure: A Deeper Statutory Bar
Even assuming the notification had been published, the court held that the government could not, under the guise of a notification, create a new class of competent authority. The bench emphasized that the statutory language of Section 55 is unequivocal: it only permits the extension of powers to a District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Superintendent of Police is not mentioned. “The Superintendent of Police does not fall within either of the categories expressly contemplated by . The office or cadre of Superintendent of Police cannot be equated with that of a District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The statutory authority identified by the legislature cannot be substituted by another authority merely by an executive act of delegation,” the court held.
Precedent Reinforces Principle
Justice Magadum relied on settled law from the , including State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh (AIR 1964 SC 358) and Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. (2001), which established that when a statute prescribes the manner and authority for the exercise of a power, any deviation, including action by an unauthorized person, renders the act invalid. The court also cited Sangeeta Suryavanshi v. State of Chhattisgarh (1991) for the proposition that executive instructions or notifications cannot amend, supersede, or run contrary to the express provisions of the parent statute.
Final Verdict: Notification and Externment Order Set Aside
Allowing the writ petition, the court declared the second part of the notification dated , as and a , insofar as it conferred powers under the Karnataka Police Act on the Superintendent of Police. Consequently, the externment order against the petitioner was quashed. The order clarified that competent statutory authorities remain free to take action strictly in accordance with the Act.
This ruling serves as a strong reminder that must operate within the four corners of enabling statutes and that executive innovation cannot supplant legislative design.
