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Expresses Shock Over Unserved Defamation Notice to MLA Dinesh Gundu Rao
The on Friday expressed visible displeasure over the apparent failure to serve notice on MLA Dinesh Gundu Rao in a criminal defamation case, even as three weeks had elapsed since the court issued the process. The single-judge bench of Justice M. Nagaprasana, hearing a petition filed by worker Tejas challenging the magistrate's order that dropped proceedings against Rao, made sharp oral observations questioning how elected representatives could remain beyond the reach of judicial process.
"…It's shocking to hear that MLAs and ministers can't be served. Ministers and politicians in the opposite building [Vidhana Soudha] are not being able to be served?"
the court enquired, referring to the state legislature that sits adjacent to the High Court. The remark underscores a growing concern within the judiciary about the effective execution of court orders, particularly when they involve high-profile political figures. The court's admonition came after the petitioner's counsel,
, informed the bench that the police had been unable to serve the notice on the respondent despite repeated attempts. The State, however, maintained that service might have been effected, while simultaneously awaiting a police report on the matter.
"…Dinesh Gundu Rao is not available, is it?"
the court asked, as the State assured it would verify the status of service.
The matter has been listed for further hearing on , leaving the question of whether the notice was ever validly served unresolved. For a court that routinely deals with procedural punctuality, the delay has raised eyebrows and may have wider implications for how criminal prosecutions against legislators are handled.
Background of the Defamation Case
The present litigation stems from a
filed by Tejas, an RSS worker, alleging that Dinesh Gundu Rao, along with Karnataka Home Minister Priyank Kharge and
leader Mohammed Haris Nalapad, made defamatory statements against the RSS and its members. The complaint, lodged under
, which criminalizes defamation, claimed that between October 2025, the accused had issued statements, social media posts, interviews, and publications containing
"false, derogatory and
"
against the organization and its affiliates.
The allegations were not limited to general criticism. The complaint specifically referenced a that suggested RSS workers had threatened Priyank Kharge and his family, and even drew connections between the RSS and the murders of rationalists Gauri Lankesh, Malleshappa Kalburgi, and Govind Pansare. The language was pointed, and the complainant argued that these imputations were not merely political commentary but were designed to incite public hatred and damage the reputation of the RSS.
After recording the sworn statements of the complainant and his supporting witnesses, the Magistrate issued notice to the accused under . On , the Magistrate took against Accused Nos. 1 (Priyank Kharge) and 3 (Mohammed Haris Nalapad) for the offence under , but dropped proceedings against Accused No. 2, Dinesh Gundu Rao.
The High Court's Displeasure Over
The immediate issue before the High Court is not the merits of the defamation allegation itself, but the failure to serve the respondent with the court's notice. The petitioner, Tejas, has moved the High Court under (which corresponds to the older ) to challenge the magistrate's order dropping Rao from the case. Tejas contends that Rao did not merely forward or repost content, but actively endorsed the . The petition highlights a tweet by Rao that allegedly amplified the false narrative and contributed to the spread of the defamatory material.
During the hearing, the court's interest in the
was not merely procedural. The bench's observations reflect a deeper concern: if a senior MLA can avoid service for weeks, what does that say about the accessibility of the judicial system to ordinary citizens? The court's reminder that the MLA's office is literally across the street from the High Court added a layer of irony to the situation.
"It's the opposite building [Vidhana Soudha],"
the court noted, underlining that the failure to serve was not due to geographical distance but perhaps a lack of diligence or a deliberate avoidance.
The State's response—first suggesting service might have been effected, then requesting time to verify—did little to assuage the bench. The petitioner's counsel pointed out that the State had almost three weeks to complete the service, and the court chose to schedule the matter for a further hearing on , effectively granting the State a final opportunity to confirm whether the notice had been validly served.
The Core Legal Contestation
Beyond the procedural wrinkle, the substantive legal question in the petition is whether Dinesh Gundu Rao's involvement in the alleged defamatory campaign meets the threshold for under . The magistrate, in dropping Rao's name, may have concluded that Rao's role was limited to sharing or endorsing content generated by others. However, the petitioner argues that Rao's actions went beyond mere dissemination. The petition asserts that Rao actively endorsed the , pointing to his tweet that repeated the allegations against the RSS and knitted them into a narrative of criminality.
The distinction between "sharing" and "endorsing" is central to defamation law, especially in the digital age. Courts have increasingly held that reposting or retweeting defamatory content can itself constitute if the person adopting the content does so with knowledge or intent to cause harm. The petitioner's case seems designed to test that boundary. By highlighting Rao's explicit , the petitioner seeks to bring Rao within the ambit of Section 356, which punishes anyone who "makes, publishes or circulates" defamatory matter.
The High Court's eventual ruling on this point could have significant consequences for public figures who engage with social media. If the court finds that a mere retweet or share, accompanied by commentary, is sufficient to attract criminal defamation, it could create a chilling effect on political speech. Conversely, if the court insists on a higher standard of active intent, it may shield politicians who merely amplify statements made by others.
The Significance of the Service Issue
While the substantive arguments are likely to be heard in later hearings, the court's focus on service has its own legal significance. is not a mere formality; it is a cornerstone of . A person cannot be expected to respond to allegations they have never seen. The court’s exasperation suggests that it views the delay as an attack on the credibility of the judicial process itself.
The situation also raises questions about the effectiveness of police machinery in executing court orders. If the police are unable or unwilling to serve notice on a prominent politician, what chance does an ordinary litigant have? The court's oral remarks can be seen as a reprimand to the State, implying that the law must be applied equally to all, regardless of political stature.
Moreover, the case underscores a practical dilemma: when a respondent is an influential figure, there may be a temptation to claim non-service to delay proceedings. The court's insistence on receiving a definitive police report is a step toward curbing such tactics. The next hearing will not only resolve the service question but also determine the course of the defamation proceedings against all accused.
Impact on Legal Practice
This case serves as a reminder to criminal defence lawyers and prosecutors alike that procedural compliance is non-negotiable. For lawyers representing complainants, the case illustrates the importance of aggressively pursuing service of process and ensuring that the court is kept apprised of any obstacles. For defence lawyers, the incident may prompt a reevaluation of how they communicate with clients about pending notices.
The High Court's observation also has a broader systemic dimension. It highlights the need for courts to actively monitor service of process, especially in cases involving public figures. The judiciary's willingness to question a State's failure to serve a high-profile respondent may lead to stricter standards for documenting service attempts and for holding defaulting officers accountable.
Additionally, the substantive issue of active in defamation is increasingly relevant in an era of social media. Lawyers will be watching this case to see how the High Court navigates the fine line between freedom of expression and . A ruling that clarifies the standard for "" could provide much-needed guidance for lower courts dealing with similar complaints.
Conclusion
The 's expression of shock over the unserved notice is more than a passing judicial irritation—it is a signal that courts are prepared to enforce procedural rigor even when the respondent holds a position of power. The case, titled (Crl.P No. 9944/2026), is now scheduled for further hearing on , when the court will likely expect a clear statement from the State regarding service. In the meantime, the substantive question of whether Dinesh Gundu Rao can be held criminally liable for his alleged of defamatory content remains open. For legal practitioners, this matter is a reminder that the law's reach is not limited by a legislator's office address, and that the judicial process will not silently tolerate attempts to evade its grasp.
