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: Internal Committee Report Cannot Close Sexual Harassment FIR Under Section 354A IPC
The has firmly held that a report from an Internal Committee cannot substitute for a proper police investigation in a sexual harassment case, especially when the alleged offence is cognizable. The decision came in a writ petition filed by Dr. Ashwin Hebbar, an Associate Professor at , who sought to quash an FIR registered under .
Justice V Srishananda, presiding over the single bench, dismissed the petition, emphasising that neither the closure of an internal inquiry nor a delay in filing the complaint are grounds to quash a criminal case at the initial stage.
The Background: A Complaint of Sexual Harassment
The case arose from an incident on , when a junior resident working under Dr. Hebbar alleged that he subjected her to unwelcome physical contact and made sexually coloured remarks inside his office. The incident was immediately reported to the institution's , which conducted an inquiry and closed the matter. However, on —28 days after the alleged incident—the complainant lodged a formal complaint with the , leading to the registration of FIR in Crime No. 70/2022 under Section 354A IPC.
Dr. Hebbar approached the High Court under read with , arguing that the belated complaint was an afterthought and that the Internal Committee's closure of the matter should preclude criminal proceedings.
Arguments Presented
Petitioner's Stand : Represented by advocate , Dr. Hebbar contended that the complainant had already participated in an internal inquiry and the matter had been closed. He argued that the police complaint, filed after a delay of 28 days, was intended solely to malign his reputation. Relying on the committee's findings, he sought quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings.
State's Response : Additional Public Prosecutor opposed the petition, submitting that all available defences could be raised before the investigation officer. He asserted that the FIR was properly registered and the investigation should be allowed to proceed.
Legal Analysis: Why the Internal Committee Report Cannot Close a Criminal Case
The court carefully examined the material on record and rejected the petitioner's grounds. Justice Srishananda noted that the incident occurred in the petitioner's chamber, which was part of an OPD section, and that the complainant had immediately approached the Internal Committee. However, the court drew a sharp distinction between an internal inquiry and a criminal investigation.
“Admittedly such reports would not be sufficient enough to close the criminal case unless an investigation takes place as the offence under Section 354A of IPC is a .”
The court underscored that a mandates investigation by the police, and no internal committee's findings can substitute that requirement. The delay in filing the FIR was also addressed:
“Delay in lodging the complaint cannot be a ground for quashing the FIR that too at the inception stage. At the most, delay in filing the FIR can be a defence that is available to the accused if the charge sheet is filed during the trial.”
Furthermore, the court observed that the other arguments raised by the petitioner were essentially defences that could be tested during trial, not at the threshold.
“Likewise, the other grounds that are argued in the petition are more in the nature of defence in the trial which would not be sufficient enough to quash the pending FIR having regard to the settled parameters.”
The Court's Decision: Petition Dismissed
In a brief but definitive order, Justice Srishananda dismissed the writ petition, keeping all available defences open for the petitioner. The court also granted Dr. Hebbar the liberty to challenge any adverse report that may be filed against him during investigation.
The ruling sends a clear message: an internal committee's closure of a sexual harassment complaint does not immunise the accused from criminal prosecution. For cognizable offences like those under Section 354A IPC, the police must be allowed to investigate independently. The judgment reinforces the principle that the quashing power under is to be exercised sparingly and only when the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose any offence.
