Karnataka High Court quashes FIR against BJP's Chalavadi Narayanaswamy, TS Srivatsa over ST status remarks
In a significant ruling that reinforces the boundaries of free political speech, the quashed an FIR against leader and Leader of Opposition in the , Chalavadi Narayanaswamy, and sitting MLA TS Srivatsa. The case stemmed from their statements opposing the grant of Scheduled Tribe status to the Kuruba community. Justice M. Nagaprasanna held that mere opposition to a reservation policy cannot constitute an offence under , which penalises acts promoting enmity between groups.
A Political Statement, Not a Crime
The controversy began when Narayanaswamy and Srivatsa made statements—both in their offices and on social media—opposing the proposal to classify the Kuruba community as a Scheduled Tribe. The complainant alleged that these remarks humiliated the community and were intended to create public disorder. Based on this, the registered Crime No. 97/2025 under (corresponding to the former ). The petitioners moved the High Court under ( ) seeking quashing of the FIR.
argued that the statements were a legitimate expression of political dissent and did not meet the ingredients of the offence. He relied on a string of judgments emphasising that the offence requires a deliberate intent to promote disharmony—an element wholly absent here. countered that the investigation was at a nascent stage and that a case existed.
The Legal Test: and the “Reasonable Man” Standard
Justice Nagaprasanna meticulously examined the complaint and the law. He noted that the core issue was whether political opposition to a reservation policy could be criminalised. Drawing extensively from the ’s recent decision in Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat ( ) and the earlier Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra ( ), the court reiterated that is an essential ingredient of . “The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the of the offence,” the court observed, quoting the Apex Court.
The judgment also applied the “reasonable man” test from Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya ( ), which holds that words must be judged from the standpoint of a firm and courageous individual, not a weak or hypersensitive one. “The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity,” the court noted.
“Opposition Does Not Amount to Offence”
The High Court concluded that the petitioners had merely protested against the proposed ST status for Kurubas. “Talks that were going on at that point in time, this by itself would not make an offence under / ,” Justice Nagaprasanna wrote. Emphasising the fundamental right to dissent under , the court held that criticism of government policy is an integral part of democracy. “If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under , democracy will not survive,” it added, quoting Javed Ahmad Hajam .
Key Observations from the Judgment
- “The petitioners did protest against the reservation / Scheduled Tribe - Kuruba reservation. Talks that were going on at that point in time, this by itself would not make an offence under / .”
- “ will have to be read into . In this case, looking to the text of the words spoken and the context in which those were spoken, it is impossible to attribute any to the appellant.”
- “Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or group of individuals is an integral part of a healthy civilised society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by .”
Final Order and Implications
Allowing the criminal petition, Justice Nagaprasanna quashed the entire investigation in Crime No. 97/2025 pending before the . The ruling underscores that political dissent, even when sharp and critical, must be protected unless it crosses the clear threshold of incitement to violence. It also serves as a reminder to investigative agencies to conduct a preliminary inquiry in cases involving speech offences, as mandated by , to ensure that fundamental rights are not trampled by premature FIRs.