Karnataka High Court to Hear Priyank Kharge Plea to Quash Defamation Case Over RSS Remarks

The Karnataka High Court is set to examine a petition filed by state Home Minister Priyank Kharge seeking to quash criminal defamation proceedings initiated against him over alleged remarks concerning the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The petition, registered as Criminal Petition No. 13980 of 2026, challenges the June 27, 2026 order of the Bengaluru Special Court for cases against sitting and former MPs and MLAs, which took cognizance of an offence under Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) against Kharge and Congress MLA Mohammed Haris Nalapad. The matter is listed before Justice Ananth Ramanath Hegde.

The case stems from a private complaint filed by A. Tejas, an RSS member, who alleged that Kharge made defamatory statements against the organization and its members through social media posts and other public statements in October 2025. The complaint also included allegations against Nalapad. While the Special Court found sufficient prima facie material to proceed against Kharge and Nalapad, it dropped proceedings against former Karnataka Minister Dinesh Gundu Rao. Kharge has denied the allegations and now seeks to bring the criminal proceedings to an end at the threshold.

Background: The Allegations and the Cognizance Order

The controversy began in October 2025 when Kharge, a prominent Congress leader and Karnataka Home Minister, reportedly made statements critical of the RSS through social media platforms and public addresses. The complainant, A. Tejas, alleged that these remarks were defamatory and harmed the reputation of the organization. The private complaint was filed in the Bengaluru Special Court, which is designated to handle cases against sitting and former members of Parliament and state legislatures.

On June 27, 2026, the Special Court passed an order taking cognizance of the offence under Section 356 BNS, which criminalizes defamation. The court held that the material placed before it disclosed a prima facie case against Kharge and Nalapad, warranting further proceedings. However, the court declined to proceed against Dinesh Gundu Rao, finding no sufficient grounds. The order set the stage for a trial, with the court issuing process against the two accused.

Kharge and Nalapad subsequently appeared before the trial court. On August 29, the Special Court granted them bail, noting that the offence under Section 356 BNS is bailable. Both accused denied the allegations and expressed their intention to contest the proceedings. The matter was then posted for recording of the complainant’s evidence.

Exemption from Personal Appearance and Further Delays

On September 19, the trial court granted Kharge and Nalapad exemption from personal appearance under Section 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). This provision allows an accused to be represented by counsel and dispenses with their physical presence if it would cause undue hardship. The court also granted the complainant a final opportunity to lead evidence, with the matter listed for October 7.

The exemption order reflects a pragmatic approach by the trial court, recognizing that Kharge ordinarily resides in Kerala and that requiring his repeated personal attendance could be burdensome. However, the underlying criminal proceedings continued, prompting Kharge to move the High Court for a more decisive remedy—quashing of the entire case.

Grounds for Quashing: Hardship and Lack of Defamatory Intent

In his petition before the Karnataka High Court, Kharge has raised several grounds to challenge the cognizance order and the continuation of proceedings. A key argument is that he has been represented through counsel and that his personal appearance before the trial court causes difficulties due to his residence in Kerala. While this ground was partially addressed by the exemption order, Kharge contends that the mere pendency of the case causes prejudice and that the allegations do not constitute defamation under Section 356 BNS.

The petition emphasizes that the alleged statements were made in the course of public discourse on matters of political and social importance, and that they do not meet the threshold of defamation as defined in the BNS. Kharge argues that the complainant has failed to demonstrate how the remarks harmed the reputation of the RSS or its members, and that the Special Court erred in taking cognizance without a proper examination of the ingredients of the offence.

The High Court’s examination at this stage is limited to whether the cognizance order is legally sustainable. The petition does not invite a finding on the truth or falsity of the remarks; rather, it questions whether the material on record could justify the initiation of criminal proceedings. This is a standard inquiry under Section 482 CrPC (read with Article 227 of the Constitution), where the court assesses whether the complaint discloses a prima facie case or whether the proceedings amount to an abuse of process.

Legal Analysis: Section 356 BNS and the Scope of Criminal Defamation

Section 356 BNS corresponds to the erstwhile Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, which defines defamation as making or publishing any imputation concerning a person intended to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of that person. The provision has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation, with the Supreme Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) upholding its constitutional validity while emphasizing that it must be applied in a manner that does not unduly restrict free speech.

In the present case, the key legal question is whether Kharge’s remarks—made in the context of political commentary—fall within the exceptions to defamation, such as fair comment on public conduct or expression of opinion in good faith. The RSS, as an organization, is a public body, and criticism of its activities may be protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, provided it does not cross the line into personal malice or falsehood.

The Special Court’s cognizance order indicates that it found prima facie material to proceed. However, the High Court, in a quashing petition, is not bound by that finding if the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not constitute an offence. Kharge’s petition likely argues that the statements were expressions of political opinion and did not target any identifiable individual, thereby lacking the requisite element of harm to reputation.

Moreover, the fact that the complainant is an RSS member rather than the organization itself raises questions about locus standi. Under Section 356 BNS, only the person defamed can file a complaint, though an exception exists for organizations where the imputation concerns the organization as a whole. The High Court may examine whether the complainant had the authority to represent the RSS’s interests.

Impact on Legal Practice: Strategic Use of Private Complaints in Political Defamation

This case highlights a growing trend in Indian litigation where private complaints for defamation are used as a tool to silence political dissent. The involvement of a sitting Home Minister adds a layer of significance, as it raises issues of separation of powers and the misuse of criminal process. For legal practitioners, the case offers a valuable precedent on the boundaries of criminal defamation in the context of political speech.

The High Court’s decision on the quashing petition will be closely watched by lawyers handling defamation cases, particularly those involving public figures and organizations. If the court finds that the allegations do not disclose an offence, it could reaffirm the principle that mere political criticism, without personal animus, cannot be criminalized. Conversely, if the court upholds the proceedings, it may embolden more such complaints against politicians and activists.

The procedural aspects—such as the grant of bail for a bailable offence and exemption from appearance—are routine but underscore the practical challenges faced by accused persons, especially those who live outside the court’s jurisdiction. Kharge’s plea to quash the entire case, rather than seeking piecemeal relief, reflects a strategic decision to avoid prolonged litigation that could distract from his official duties.

Conclusion: Awaiting the High Court’s Verdict

The Karnataka High Court is now seized of a petition that could determine the fate of the defamation case against Priyank Kharge and Mohammed Haris Nalapad. While the trial court has already taken cognizance and begun proceedings, the High Court’s intervention at this stage could bring the matter to a close if it finds the complaint legally untenable.

The case underscores the delicate balance between the right to free speech and the protection of reputation, a tension that courts have grappled with for decades. For now, the legal community awaits Justice Hegde’s ruling, which will not only affect the parties but also provide guidance on the application of Section 356 BNS in politically charged defamation disputes. The next hearing is expected to address the maintainability of the quashing petition, with arguments focusing on the sufficiency of the complaint and the applicability of the defamation law to remarks made in public discourse.