Karnataka Human Rights Court Rule 6 Valid, Prior NHRC Inquiry Not Mandatory: Supreme Court

A Two-Track System for Human Rights Protection

The Supreme Court of India has affirmed that victims of human rights violations can directly approach Human Rights Courts without first seeking an inquiry or recommendation from the National or State Human Rights Commissions. A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta upheld Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006, ruling that it is neither inconsistent with the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 nor beyond the State's rule-making power under Section 41 of the Act. The judgment, delivered on August 25, 2026, sets aside a Karnataka High Court order that had struck down the rule and quashed proceedings against police officials.

The Case That Sparked the Challenge

The dispute originated from a private complaint filed by Sayad Asifulla before the Human Rights Court in Vijayapura, alleging human rights violations by police officers during his custody. On January 20, 2024, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, acting as Special Judge for the Human Rights Court, directed investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. Consequently, Crime No. 15 of 2024 was registered at Jalanagar Police Station against the concerned police officials.

Aggrieved, the police officers approached the Karnataka High Court, challenging the validity of Rule 6 and seeking quashing of the proceedings. The High Court struck down Rule 6 as unconstitutional, holding that it created a parallel substantive regime and exceeded the State's delegated legislative power. Both the complainant and the State of Karnataka appealed to the Supreme Court.

High Court's Error: Reading a Limitation into the Statute

The Supreme Court identified a fundamental flaw in the High Court's reasoning. The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 establishes two distinct institutional mechanisms: Human Rights Commissions (Sections 12–18) with inquisitorial and recommendatory functions , and Human Rights Courts (Section 30) with judicial power to try offences arising from human rights violations. The Court observed that "nothing in Sections 12 to 18 of the 1993 Act expressly provides that every prosecution concerning an offence arising out of a violation of human rights must originate from a recommendation of the Commission."

The Bench emphasised that Section 30 does not condition the Human Rights Court's jurisdiction on prior proceedings before the Commission. "To read such a limitation into the statute would amount to supplying a condition which Parliament itself has not enacted," the judgment states.

Rule 6 Supplements, Not Supplants the Act

Addressing concerns about delegated legislation, the Court clarified that Rule 6 does not create any new offence, punishment, or expand the definition of human rights. It merely provides the procedural mechanism for invoking the jurisdiction already conferred by Section 30. The rule-making power under Section 41(1) is general and not confined to the illustrative list in sub-section (2). The Court cited St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE to reiterate that rules can supplement the parent Act by providing ancillary procedural machinery , so long as they do not supplant it. Rule 6, the Court held, "supplements Section 30 of the 1993 Act by prescribing the procedure through which a Human Rights Court may deal with offences arising out of violations of human rights."

Complementary Remedies, Not Double Jeopardy

The High Court had also expressed concern that simultaneous recourse to the Commission and the Human Rights Court could lead to double jeopardy. The Supreme Court dismissed this fear, noting that an inquiry or recommendation by the Commission does not constitute prosecution or punishment. The two remedies are distinct and complementary. The Bench relied on Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh , where this Court had already recognised that complaints relating to police use of force may be made both to the State Human Rights Commission and to the Human Rights Court.

Key Observations from the Bench

The Court made several pivotal observations:

"The mere conferment of power upon the Commission to inquire into a complaint and, where appropriate, recommend initiation of prosecution cannot, in our view, be construed as making such an inquiry or recommendation an indispensable condition precedent to the initiation of criminal proceedings."

"Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules does not create any new offence, prescribe any new punishment or enlarge the meaning of human rights under the 1993 Act. It merely provides the procedural means by which the jurisdiction conferred upon a Human Rights Court under Section 30 of the 1993 Act may be invoked and exercised."

"The language employed by Parliament makes it clear that the matters specified in clauses (a) to (c) are illustrative and do not exhaust the amplitude of the general power conferred by sub-section (1)."

The Final Word

The Supreme Court allowed both appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring Crime No. 15 of 2024 and the proceedings arising from PCR No. 1 of 2024. The Court directed that the proceedings continue from the stage they were at before the High Court's intervention. Importantly, the Bench clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the allegations, and all contentions and defences remain open for consideration by the competent court.

This judgment reinforces the independent vitality of Human Rights Courts and ensures that victims are not forced through a potentially lengthy Commission inquiry before seeking judicial redress. It is a significant affirmation of the procedural autonomy granted to Human Rights Courts under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.