Rules Can Act as in Navy
In a pivotal judgment clarifying the contours of rights within the , the has upheld the legality of a naval regulation that allows an to also serve as the in a . A Division Bench of Justice K. Natarajan and Justice Johnson John set aside a single judge's observation that such inherently violate , ruling instead that the provision is valid under the restrictions permissible for the armed forces.
The Case: A Naval Officer's Challenge to
The dispute stemmed from a proceeding against Santosh Karwade , a naval officer with 31 years of service, who was accused of dishonestly inducing a fellow officer to transfer ₹1.10 lakh. During the trial, Karwade discovered that the officer who had investigated the allegations against him had been appointed as the . He promptly approached the High Court, arguing that this arrangement breached his right to a under Article 21.
Karwade specifically challenged
of the
, which states that
"the
is a
."
He contended that the regulation permitted an unconstitutional
, as the
—who had already formed an opinion—could not be a
to prosecute.
Arguments from Both Sides
The petitioner's counsel, , argued that the regulation violated basic principles of criminal jurisprudence and that the word "" in could not include the . She relied on precedents that emphasized the need for an independent to ensure a .
The , represented by Additional Solicitor General , countered that empowers Parliament to restrict fundamental rights for armed forces personnel. He pointed out that the and the Regulations form a , and the does not apply to proceedings. The ASGI also argued that the 's role is limited to placing evidence before the court, and that the single judge's observation was unwarranted.
Court's Legal Analysis: A
The Division Bench conducted a detailed analysis of the , the Regulations, and the interplay with the Constitution. It noted that specifically restricts fundamental rights to the extent provided in the Act, and saves special laws like the from its application. The court observed that the Regulations in Chapter V provide a complete procedural code for investigations, trials, and sentences.
On the core issue, the court held that does not explicitly prohibit the from being appointed as . Instead, it impliedly permits it, as the can be called as a witness. The court rejected the argument that this arrangement violates Article 21, stating:
" of the Navy Regulations cannot be said to be to of India, but it is valid in view of the restrictions under of India."
The bench also clarified the role of the , distinguishing it from that of a judge:
"The sole duty of the is to place the evidence before the . The judgment or order of sentence is to be delivered by the itself, and not by the . Therefore, the need not be an independent authority but must be a for prosecuting the case before the ."
The court further distinguished the 's ruling in V.K. Singh's case (2026), noting that it involved the , where no special law existed, and thus the CrPC applied.
The Decision and Its Implications
The Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by Santosh Karwade and allowed the appeal filed by the . It set aside the single judge's observation that appointing the as would prejudice the trial. The court made it clear that the issue of whether the trial was vitiated due to the 's role would be left to the to decide, should Karwade challenge his conviction and sentence.
This ruling affirms the special status of military law and the parliamentary power to restrict fundamental rights for discipline and efficiency in the armed forces. It also provides clarity for numerous pending cases where investigating officers have been appointed as prosecutors, effectively upholding the existing practice under the Navy Regulations.