Kerala High Court Says State Has No Absolute Right to Object in Thachankary's Sentence Suspension

The Kerala High Court on Tuesday made a significant procedural observation while hearing former Director General of Police (DGP) Tomin J. Thachankary's appeal against his conviction in a disproportionate assets case. Justice A. Badharudeen noted that the State does not possess an absolute right to file written objections opposing the suspension of a convict's sentence when the imprisonment term imposed is less than ten years. The Court granted the State two days—until September 24—to file its counter, but only after acknowledging that such a right is not unfettered under the law.

The case, registered as Criminal Appeal No. 1239 of 2026, arises from Thachankary's conviction by the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge (Vigilance) in Kottayam. He was found guilty under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of ₹30.84 lakh. The trial court determined that even after accounting for all material discrepancies established through evidence, Thachankary's disproportionate assets amounted to 52.33% of his known income.

The Hearing: State Seeks to File Written Objections

When the matter came up for hearing, the public prosecutor submitted that the State wished to file a formal counter objecting to Thachankary's plea to suspend his sentence pending the appeal. Thachankary's counsel opposed this request, arguing that the sentence was only four years—well below the ten-year threshold that typically triggers a more rigorous procedural requirement.

"This is the first time the prosecution is asking to file written objections in a case with less than 10 years' sentence," the defense counsel remarked, highlighting the unusual nature of the State's demand.

The Court appeared to agree with the defense's position. "This sentence is under 10 years. There is no absolute right to file objection. You may have a right but it is not absolute," Justice Badharudeen observed, addressing the State's counsel directly. The observation underscores a key procedural principle : while the prosecution can seek to be heard, the court retains discretion over whether to permit written submissions that could delay the hearing of a suspension plea.

State Argues 'Exceptional Circumstances'

Undeterred, the State's counsel pressed the argument that this was no ordinary case. "This case cannot be treated as an ordinary case. He was a Director General of Police. His position, the seriousness of the allegations and the fact that this is a crime against society must be considered," the prosecutor submitted.

The Court was not immediately persuaded. "All Prevention of Corruption Act cases are against society," it pointed out, suggesting that the nature of the offence alone does not automatically create exceptional circumstances .

The State, however, maintained that the facts of this particular case made the filing of written objections necessary. In response, the Court posed a rhetorical question that captured the broader implications: "So this is a message to all DGPs, Ministers, Chief Ministers etc. Question is if there are exceptional circumstances ." The remark indicates that the Court was weighing whether the high-profile status of the convict could justify deviating from the normal procedural course.

Legal Significance of the 'No Absolute Right' Observation

Justice Badharudeen's oral observation is noteworthy for several reasons. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and related precedents, the prosecution's right to be heard on a sentence suspension plea is not unqualified. Where the sentence is less than ten years, the law does not mandate that the State must file a written response before the court can consider the convict's application. The court can proceed based on oral submissions or even decide the matter ex parte if the State chooses not to appear.

By explicitly stating that there is "no absolute right," the High Court reinforced the principle that procedural fairness must be balanced against the need for expeditious disposal of interim applications. Delays in hearing suspension pleas can effectively prolong incarceration even before the merits of an appeal are examined, raising concerns about pre-conviction detention in the context of a right to appeal.

Moreover, the Court's reference to "a message to all DGPs, Ministers, Chief Ministers" signals a sensitivity to the potential misuse of procedural tactics in high-profile corruption cases. The State's attempt to characterize the case as exceptional because of the convict's former rank could set a precedent that the higher the office, the more procedural hurdles a convict may face—an approach the Court seemed reluctant to endorse without clear statutory backing.

Impact on Legal Practice and Corruption Prosecutions

This interim ruling, though procedural, carries practical implications for both prosecution and defense lawyers. For the defense, it affirms that the State cannot automatically insist on filing written objections in every sentence suspension application. Defense counsel can now argue, relying on this observation, that where the sentence is under ten years, the court should proceed promptly without waiting for formal counters unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated.

For the prosecution, the ruling imposes a higher burden. To justify filing written objections, the State must point to specific factors that go beyond the generic gravity of corruption offences. Factors such as the convict's position, the quantum of disproportionate assets, or the risk of absconding may need to be substantiated with concrete evidence rather than mere assertions.

The case also highlights the tension between the public interest in punishing corruption and the procedural rights of the accused. The High Court's measured approach—acknowledging the State's right to be heard but denying it an absolute right—reflects a careful balancing act. It ensures that even high-profile convicts are not subjected to arbitrary procedural delays while also allowing the State to present its case where truly necessary.

Conclusion

The Kerala High Court's decision to grant the State time to file its counter, albeit with the caveat that no absolute right exists, sets the stage for a more substantive hearing on Thachankary's sentence suspension plea. The Court will now consider the State's objections on September 24 before deciding whether to suspend the four-year sentence pending the appeal.

For legal professionals, this development serves as a reminder that procedural rights are not automatic—they must be exercised within the bounds set by the court's discretion. The observation also reinforces the principle that the fight against corruption does not warrant procedural shortcuts that undermine the rule of law. As the case unfolds, it will be watched closely for its potential to shape how sentence suspension pleas are handled in corruption cases involving former high-ranking officials.