The High Court of Judicature at Madras has dismissed an application filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , effectively barring the use of arbitration to resolve disputes concerning the removal of a member from the State Bank of India (SBI) Officers' Association (Chennai Circle) . The ruling, delivered by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu, clarifies that the internal regulations governing the association do not extend to arbitral proceedings for matters involving the termination of an elected official or the cancellation of primary membership.

The application was brought before the court by G. Ganapathy, who served as the Regional Secretary of the association’s Madurai Module. Mr. Ganapathy, a long-standing member of the association who had been elected to his post in April 2024 , sought a judicial stay on an order issued by the association on July 28, 2026 . That order had removed him from both his position in the Executive Committee and his primary membership within the organization. The applicant requested that the court stay the operation of this removal pending the formal constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal as purportedly required under Bye-law 39 of the association’s governing rules.

Escalation of Internal Disputes The origins of the legal conflict lie in a series of administrative and interpersonal tensions within the Madurai Module of the association. Mr. Ganapathy contended that his removal followed a period of targeted harassment after he raised formal complaints regarding the conduct of a Deputy Manager who also served as an office bearer. According to his submission, the association’s response to these internal complaints was marked by bias and a failure to adhere to the fundamental principles of natural justice .

Mr. Ganapathy alleged that the inquiry committee appointed to investigate the matter was inherently prejudicial. He asserted that he was denied adequate opportunity to defend himself, including delays in receiving copies of the complaints filed against him. Furthermore, the applicant argued that the association moved to replace him through the co-option of a new Regional Secretary while he was still officially holding the position. The applicant maintained that his summary removal would result in irreparable prejudice , as it effectively stripped him of his professional standing and the benefits associated with his role.

The association, represented by its legal counsel, challenged the maintainability of the application. The organization maintained that its internal bye-laws provide a clear and distinct mechanism for addressing grievances related to member conduct, primarily through an appeal process to the General Body . The respondent argued that the applicant’s attempt to characterize an administrative disciplinary action as a dispute subject to arbitration was an attempt to bypass the established internal hierarchy of the union.

Judicial Interpretation of Governing Bye-laws In determining whether the dispute was arbitrable , the Court conducted a focused review of the association’s internal regulatory framework. Central to the court’s analysis was Bye-law 39 , which outlines the conditions under which the association may resort to voluntary arbitration . The court observed that this specific clause is reserved for disputes regarding the interpretation of the bye-laws themselves, instances where the bye-laws are silent, or actions taken by the Secretariat that create significant friction among office bearers.

The court emphasized that the power of the Executive Committee to discipline or remove members is vested through specific provisions, notably Clauses 74 through 81 , which govern the cessation and removal of members and office holders. Crucially, the court noted that the power of removal is an independent exercise of administrative authority. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu observed, “A reading of the said bye-law as indicated above would mean that only if differences arise in the Executive committee on the interpretation of a bye-law or where the bye-laws are silent/any action of the Secretariat/Office bearers, there is a difference arising on the decision of the Executive committee only then such matters could be referred to arbitration .”

By strictly interpreting the scope of Bye-law 39 , the court concluded that the disciplinary removal of a member from their elected post does not constitute a matter of “substantial importance” that triggers the arbitration clause. The court highlighted the distinction between a policy-level dispute regarding bye-laws and a disciplinary action taken by the Executive Committee .

“When that being the interpretation, this Court is of the view that the applicant for resolving a dispute that arises out of his removal from membership of the association including his elected post cannot be subject matter of an arbitration , as there is no arbitration clause for resolving such a dispute,” the court stated in its judgment.

Final Order and Procedural Outcome The Madras High Court concluded that because no valid arbitration agreement covered the subject matter of the applicant’s grievance, the petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , was fundamentally flawed in its request for interim relief . By finding the application not maintainable, the court effectively upheld the internal disciplinary measures taken by the State Bank of India Officers' Association , while implicitly directing the parties to seek recourse through the association's existing internal appeal mechanisms, specifically the General Body , as provided for in their bye-laws.

With the dismissal of the application, the court has made it clear that internal union disciplinary actions fall outside the reach of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act unless explicitly provided for in the governing documents. Mr. Ganapathy’s request for a stay on the removal order was denied, leaving the association’s decision to remain in effect while the applicant is left to determine if he will pursue remedies through the General Body or other available civil forums. The court ordered that there shall be no costs awarded for these proceedings, concluding the judicial intervention at this stage.