Mere Nomination in FIR Can't Sustain Conviction Under Section 149 IPC: Allahabad High Court

In a significant ruling on constructive criminal liability, the Allahabad High Court has acquitted two appellants in a murder case, holding that mere nomination in the First Information Report (FIR), without reliable evidence of membership in an unlawful assembly and shared common object, cannot sustain a conviction under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Appeal Survives for Two Accused

The appeal was filed by eight individuals convicted in 1988 under Sections 147, 148, 302/149, 325/149, and 323/149 IPC. During the pendency of the appeal, six of the appellants—Suresh, Devendra, Harendra, Ramdhan, Jaipal, and Ravendra—died, causing the appeal to abate against them. The matter thus proceeded only for the surviving appellants, Nagendra and Jugendra, who were represented by Amicus Curiae Sri Aryan Srivastava. The bench comprised Justice Salil Kumar Rai and Justice Padam Narain Mishra, with the latter delivering the judgment.

The Prosecution's Case and Trial

The prosecution alleged that on the date of the incident, around 2:30 PM, the eight accused, armed with lathis, spears, spades, and a gandasa, assaulted Om Pal Singh near the house of Kajam Puriya. Om Pal Singh succumbed to his injuries. His family members—Satendra, Rajpal, Vedpal, and Smt. Gyan Devi—who rushed to rescue him were also allegedly assaulted. The FIR was lodged promptly by Vijendra at 3:30 PM the same day. The trial court convicted all eight accused.

Critical Flaws in the Evidence

The High Court noted several critical weaknesses in the prosecution's case against Nagendra and Jugendra. While they were named in the FIR, no specific role or overt act was attributed to either of them. No particular weapon was associated with them. Of the five prosecution witnesses examined, only PW-1 (the informant) supported the prosecution version. The other four witnesses, including injured witnesses PW-2 Satendra and PW-5 Smt. Gyan Devi (the deceased's wife), were declared hostile. PW-2 stated he could not identify who assaulted him, and PW-5 said she did not know who killed her husband.

The court also highlighted the existence of a cross-case from the same incident and that six accused persons sustained injuries, which the prosecution failed to explain. This, the bench observed, cast further doubt on the narrative of a unilateral assault by an unlawful assembly.

Legal Principle: Constructive Liability Under Section 149 IPC

The bench extensively discussed the legal requirements for invoking Section 149 IPC, which embodies the principle of constructive or vicarious liability. Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Kuldip Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar (2011) and Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (2011), the court emphasised that before fastening such liability, the prosecution must first establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of an unlawful assembly as defined in Section 141 IPC, the accused's membership thereof, and the requisite common object.

Mere presence at the scene or mere naming in the FIR, the court reiterated, is insufficient to attract constructive liability. The court observed that the trial court had failed to record any clear finding on the nature of the assembly, its common object, or how Nagendra and Jugendra shared that object.

Key Observations from the Bench

The judgment contains several powerful observations that underscore the principle:

" Mere nomination in the FIR , by itself, cannot establish their guilt."

"Before fastening constructive liability upon an accused under Section 149 IPC, the Court must be satisfied that the prosecution has established, beyond reasonable doubt , not only his membership of the alleged unlawful assembly but also the existence of the requisite common object or the knowledge contemplated by Section 149 IPC. Mere presence , without more, cannot be treated as sufficient to attract such vicarious criminal liability ."

"There is no discussion as to how the assembly constituted an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 141 IPC , what was the common object of the assembly, when and where such common object was formed, and in what manner the surviving appellants shared or were proved to have shared such common object ."

"In the absence of a finding that the surviving appellants were members of an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 141 IPC and shared its common object , their conviction with the aid of Section 149 IPC cannot be sustained."

Final Verdict: Acquittal

The High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the essential ingredients of Section 149 IPC against Nagendra and Jugendra. The trial court's judgment and order dated January 19, 1988, was set aside in their favour. The appeal was allowed, and both appellants were acquitted. Their bail bonds were cancelled, and the sureties discharged, but they were directed to comply with Section 437-A of the CrPC (corresponding to Section 481 of the BNSS) by furnishing requisite bonds before the trial court for the period prescribed by law.

The court also directed that Rs. 15,000 be paid to the Amicus Curiae, Sri Aryan Srivastava, from the Legal Services Authority for his assistance.