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MP High Court Refuses to Quash Constable's FIR Over Hindu Deities Video Despite Compromise
A single-judge bench of the , comprising Justice Himanshu Joshi, dismissed a petition seeking of a criminal case against a police constable accused of circulating a video about Hindu deities on Facebook, holding that offences affecting and cannot be quashed merely because the complainant has withdrawn from the dispute.
The petition was filed under (BNSS), read with , seeking of FIR registered as Crime No.410/2019 at , for offences punishable under Sections 295-A, 153-A, and 505(2) of the .
The Allegations and the Dispute
Soma Singh Dhurve, a Constable (T.M.) serving in the , was accused — along with co-accused persons — of uploading, sharing, and circulating a video on social media platforms, particularly Facebook, that related to Hindu deities in a manner allegedly hurtful to the religious sentiments of members of the Hindu community. The complainant, Sonal Barman, alleged that the content carried the potential to create disharmony between different groups.
Following the FIR, departmental proceedings were also initiated against Dhurve, and a departmental charge-sheet was issued during the pendency of the criminal case. At some point during the litigation, the petitioner and the complainant purportedly resolved their dispute amicably, with Barman submitting an affidavit (Annexure A-3) stating that the matter had arisen out of a misunderstanding and that he no longer wished to pursue criminal proceedings against the constable.
Arguments Before the Court
Petitioner's Contentions: Counsel for the petitioner argued that Dhurve was falsely implicated and that no direct evidence exists to establish that he intentionally circulated or uploaded the objectionable material with a deliberate intention of outraging religious feelings or promoting enmity between communities. It was submitted that the material was allegedly shared from a mobile device, and there is no legally admissible evidence connecting the petitioner to the requisite criminal intent. Crucially, the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the compromise and the complainant's affidavit, arguing that continuing the proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner — particularly given that departmental proceedings were pending against him parallel to the criminal case.
State's Opposition: The Government Advocate countered that the offences alleged are not private disputes between individuals but offences affecting public order, , and religious sentiments. It was emphasised that Sections 295-A, 153-A, and 505(2) IPC carry wider social ramifications and are committed against society at large. The State contended that even a genuine compromise cannot, by itself, be a ground for quashing proceedings of this nature, adding that the investigation had revealed material against the petitioner and that the truthfulness of the allegations is a matter to be tested during trial.
The Court's Legal Analysis
The Court examined whether the compromise alone could justify the exercise of . It held that the inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS demand consideration not merely of the complainant's wishes but also of the nature and gravity of the offences alleged.
In rejecting the plea, the Court observed:
"The offences under Sections 295-A, 153-A and 505(2) IPC relate to deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings, promotion of enmity between different groups and dissemination of statements conducive to public mischief. Such offences are not merely personal wrongs but are offences having a direct bearing upon public peace, and . The has consistently held that serious offences having social impact cannot ordinarily be quashed solely on the basis of compromise between the parties."
On the petitioner's argument regarding absence of evidence and false implication, the Court clarified that such assertions raise which cannot be adjudicated in a petition under Section 528 BNSS. Whether Dhurve was responsible for sharing the material, whether the requisite intention existed, and whether the prosecution can establish the ingredients of the offences are matters for the trial Court to examine upon appreciation of evidence.
What the Court Decided
Dismissing the petition, the Court held that the alleged offences have an element of and are not of a purely private nature. The compromise between the petitioner and the complainant, evidenced by Annexure A-3, was deemed insufficient by itself to justify of the proceedings.
However, the Court left one door open: the compromise
"may be a relevant circumstance during the course of trial,"
meaning the parties may still raise it before the trial court when the matter proceeds to a full hearing.
Implications
The ruling reinforces the well-established position that compromise is not a magic wand in criminal cases involving societal harm or communal sensitivity. It underscores that for offences such as those under Sections 295-A and 153-A IPC — which address deliberate acts designed to outrage religious feelings and promote enmity between groups — the injury extends beyond the individual complainant to the public at large. The judgment also signals that police and government employees facing such allegations cannot expect leniency on the strength of a private settlement alone, as their conduct is judged against higher standards of public trust and service discipline.
