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NCLAT Delhi: Liquidator's 202-Day Delay Not Explained by Counsel's Personal Difficulties
The at New Delhi has firmly reiterated that a litigant cannot pin the blame for on his counsel's personal hardships. In a decision that underscores the importance of personal diligence in , a bench comprising Judicial Member Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma and Technical Members Arun Baroka and Indevar Pandey dismissed an appeal filed by liquidator Rajendra Devidas Puranik, holding that a 202-day delay in the appeal remained wholly unexplained.
The case arose from an order of the that had restricted Puranik's remuneration as liquidator to Rs. 4,00,000 plus GST, in addition to payments under Regulation 4 of the IBBI () Liquidation Regulations. Dissatisfied with that order, Puranik e-filed an appeal before the NCLAT on . However, the Registry promptly notified defects to both Puranik and his counsel on . Despite partial rectification, the appeal was ultimately refiled only on —more than four months later.
Further scrutiny on and revealed additional defects, and the Registry repeatedly alerted Puranik via email. By the time the matter came up for hearing, the Registry reported a staggering delay of 202 days in . In response, Puranik filed an seeking . Notably, the supporting was sworn by his counsel, not by Puranik himself. The counsel cited his own role as caregiver for an ailing mother undergoing treatment, claiming that this personal difficulty had prevented timely rectification of the defects.
The Bench’s Firm Stance on Litigant Responsibility
The NCLAT bench examined , which empowers the Registry to reject an appeal if defects are not cured within the prescribed period. The court held that an in support of a condonation application must be filed by the litigant in person. Counsel cannot step into the litigant’s shoes or dilute professional integrity by filing such an . As the bench observed:
“The litigant will have to stand on his own legs in order to explain the delay that has chanced in . As inability of counsel cannot be inability of litigant to restrict him in rectifying the defects when most of work involved therein is only , which could have undertaken by Appellant himself or with assistance by any other counsel.”
The Tribunal further noted that Puranik, being a liquidator, was expected to be fully conversant with procedural requirements under . Yet, he failed to act with . The bench highlighted the lack of coordination between the litigant and his counsel:
“Counsel's personal inability cannot be an inability of the Appellant to , and that too if we take into consideration the number of reports which have been given by the Registry and if it is compared with the schedule of treatment which has been given therein. There was sufficient gap in between periods wherein the Appellant could have coordinated with the counsel and should have rectified the defects.”
Legal Analysis: Delays and the Duty of Diligence
The decision reinforces a well-established principle in : a litigant cannot hide behind the personal difficulties of his advocate to explain a prolonged delay. The defects in this case were predominantly ministerial—formatting, pagination, annexure issues—that could have been easily cured by the appellant himself or through alternative assistance. The fact that the Registry issued multiple defect reports and emails over several months meant that Puranik had ample opportunity to respond.
The NCLAT’s emphasis on the being filed by the litigant personally is crucial. Courts have consistently held that the explanation for delay must come from the person who suffered the delay, not from counsel who had no direct knowledge of the appellant's circumstances. Here, the counsel’s own health-related difficulties were irrelevant to the appellant’s ability to rectify defects or instruct other counsel.
Impact on Legal Practice
This judgment serves as a stark reminder for legal practitioners and their clients—especially insolvency professionals—that procedural timelines must be scrupulously observed. The NCLAT’s observation that a liquidator should be particularly mindful of such requirements sends a clear signal: professionals cannot expect leniency merely because they are familiar with the law. The ruling also underscores the limited scope of condonation when the delay is in (as opposed to filing the appeal itself). While courts generally take a liberal view of initial filing delays, delays are treated more strictly because the appellant is already on notice of defects.
For advocates, the case highlights the importance of maintaining clear communication with clients about defect rectification. Relying solely on a counsel’s personal difficulties will not insulate the litigant from consequences. It may also prompt law firms to have backup arrangements for case management when a lead counsel is unavailable due to personal reasons.
Conclusion
By dismissing the appeal on grounds of , the NCLAT has reaffirmed that the due process of law demands active participation from the litigant. Personal hardships of counsel, however genuine, cannot substitute for the litigant’s own explanation. The message is unequivocal: when it comes to explaining delay, the litigant must stand on his own feet.
