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Lack of Child Victim Signature on Section 164 CrPC Statement Does Not Invalidate Evidence: Karnataka High Court
In a significant ruling aimed at streamlining the of sensitive cases under the , the has clarified that the absence of a child victim’s signature on a statement recorded under (CrPC) does not automatically render the document or .
Justice M. Nagaprasanna, presiding over the case, underscored that such procedural omissions do not justify the routine summoning of Magistrates to the witness box, a practice that frequently leads to unnecessary procedural delays.
A Decade of Legal Languor The case involves a FIR concerning the alleged sexual assault of a minor at a school in Bengaluru. For over 12 years, the proceeding has meandered through the , significantly missing the statutory timeline prescribed by the POCSO Act. The petitioner—the father of the victim—approached the High Court seeking to challenge a order that had declined his request to summon the Magistrate for . His primary contention was that because the child and the Magistrate had not affixed their signatures to the Section 164 statement, its authenticity was compromised.
The Court’s Reasoning The High Court drew a sharp distinction between necessary procedural compliance and speculative litigation tactics. Relying on established precedents, including the Division Bench ruling in , the Court held that a Section 164 statement is a "" that enjoys a .
The Court reasoned that the POCSO Act provides a specific protective shield for children. To insist on a child’s signature, irrespective of their cognitive maturity, age, or psychological trauma at the time of the incident, would defeat the intent of the legislation.
"This legislative omission is neither inadvertent nor accidental. It is a conscious recognition of the peculiar vulnerability of child victims,"
the bench observed.
Furthermore, regarding the summoning of Magistrates:
"The Magistrate is not to be summoned merely because a party entertains a speculative apprehension regarding the authenticity of the statement or seeks to cure perceived procedural irregularities."
The Court clarified that a Section 164 statement is used to or a witness and is not "" in itself. Consequently, it should be marked through the witness (the victim) during the trial, and the Magistrate is only to be called if the witness categorically disputes having made the statement.
Key Observations * On the signature requirement: “The POCSO Act, despite its elaborate , nowhere mandates that a child whose statement is recorded under Section 164 of the Code must append his or her signature to such statement.” * On the culture of adjournments: “Justice delayed, in cases of this nature, does not remain a mere procedural lapse—it assumes the character of a continuing injustice.” * On the role of Trial Courts: “The legislative command has... been thrown to the winds owing to the culture of repeated adjournments; nothing can be more unfortunate than this.”
A Mandate for Speed The High Court expressed deep frustration with the "slow-motion syndrome" affecting the trial, which has persisted for 12 years. Invoking , which requires trial completion within one year, and citing the ’s mandate in , the Bench firmly directed the to conclude the proceedings within .
The Court warned that if the parties employ further dilatory tactics, the is fully empowered to deny such requests and proceed day-to-day. This judgment serves as a stern reminder to the lower judiciary and legal practitioners that the procedural rights of a child victim—including the right to a swift trial—must take precedence over standard legal maneuvering.
